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THE NEW IMPARTIAL JURYMANDATE
Richard Lorren Jolly*
Impartiality is the cornerstone of the Constitution’s jury trial protections .
Courts have historically treated impartiality as procedural in nature, mean-
ing that the Constitution requires certain prophylactic procedures that secure
a jury that is more likely to reach verdicts impartially . But in Peña-
Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S . Ct . 855 (2017), the Supreme Court recognized
for the first time an enforceable, substantive component to the mandate .
There, the Court held that criminal litigants have a Sixth Amendment right
to jury decisions made without reliance on extreme bias, specifically on the
basis of race or national origin . The Court did not provide a standard for de-
termining when evidence of partiality is sufficient to set aside a verdict but
made clear that an otherwise procedurally adequate decision may fall to sub-
stantive deficiencies .
This Article advances a structural theory of the Constitution’s impartial jury
mandate, focusing on the interplay between its ex ante procedural and ex
post substantive components . The Article argues that the mandate has tradi-
tionally taken shape as a collection of procedural guarantees because of a
common law prohibition on reviewing the substance of jury deliberations .
Peña-Rodriguez tosses this constraint, allowing judges for the first time to re-
view the rationales upon which jurors base their verdicts . The Article then of-
fers a novel approach for applying substantive impartiality more broadly by
looking to the Equal Protection Clause’s tiers of scrutiny . It concludes that ex
ante procedural rules and ex post substantive review can operate in conjunc-
tion to tease out undesirable, impermissible forms of jury bias, while still al-
lowing for desirable, permissible forms of jury bias .
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INTRODUCTION
Impartiality is the cornerstone of the Constitution’s jury trial protec-
tions.1 The Sixth Amendment is explicit in its guarantee that the criminally
accused shall enjoy the right to “trial[] by an impartial jury.”2 And while by
its terms the Seventh Amendment does not command that impartial juries
resolve private disputes, courts and scholars agree that such a requirement is
implicit.3 The Fifth Amendment similarly protects in the grand jury context.4
And if a state chooses to provide a jury trial in circumstances in which a jury
is not constitutionally required, that jury must nevertheless be impartial.5
Indeed, impartiality as a concept is deeply entangled with what it means to
involve lay citizens in the administration of justice. Simply put: a partial jury
is no jury at all.
Yet despite the concept’s centrality, there is little agreement on what
makes a jury impartial. Jurors must lack specific biases against the parties,
such as having a personal interest in the outcome of the case, but defining
impermissible general biases beyond that is far more difficult. This difficulty
is the result of competing understandings of the jury’s core institutional re-
sponsibilities. On the one hand, the law invites—and at times requires—
1 . See, e .g ., Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (“[T]he impartiality of the ad-
judicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system . . . .”).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). The impartial jury right applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968).
3 . See, e .g ., McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 549 (1984);
Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1965); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitu-
tional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
4. That grand juries’ need to be impartial flows from due process considerations. For a
discussion, see Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array? A Structural Theory
of the Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 NOTREDAME L. REV. 1173, 1220 n.172 (1995).
5 . See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (“[I]f a jury is to be provided the
defendant, regardless of whether the Sixth Amendment requires it, the jury must stand impar-
tial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the Sixth Amendment.”).
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jurors to bring their unique political, moral, and psychological insights to
bear on a dispute. In this sense, the jury sits as a democratic check on the ap-
plication and development of law, ensuring that powerful social and political
actors do not operate in a manner unconstrained by popular notions of jus-
tice.6 On the other hand, the jury is conceived of as a blank slate. It is a tabula
rasa upon which only the facts presented within the courtroom are consid-
ered and the law as described by the judge is applied. To this end, the jury is
a purely neutral arbiter.7
Balancing the tension between the jury’s competing responsibilities is
critical to gaining the benefits and controlling the detriments of lay judicial
involvement. It is within this balance that a jury’s impartiality must be as-
sessed: the law requires some kinds of preconceptions (what we often call
common sense) and fundamentally rejects others (called biases). If the jury
brings too much of its own outside opinions, or the wrong kind of opinions,
into the courtroom, the parties are denied impartial consideration of their
dispute. Alternatively, it is unrealistic, and perhaps undesirable, to treat ju-
rors as if they are mere automatons. Facts and laws are fuzzy, and ignoring a
diversity of opinions robs the litigants of public consideration of their multi-
faceted dispute.8 Our system of justice expects the impartial jury to be both
wise and blind.
But historically, there has been no mechanism by which to check wheth-
er a jury was sufficiently impartial. This is because of the Mansfield Rule, al-
so known as the jury no-impeachment rule. This rule was first advanced in
1785 when Lord Mansfield refused to accept two affidavits from jurors who
claimed that the jury had reached its decision by flipping a coin.9 Although
scholars debate how firmly this rule was established before Lord Mansfield’s
articulation, that the jury could not impeach its own verdict became readily
established in the common law.10 The United States accepted the rule almost
unquestionably,11 and it is now reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),
and every state has a least some version of the rule.12 Generally speaking,
then, up until very recently only jury inputs and outputs were reviewable.
6 . See, e .g ., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Big Data Jury, 91 NOTREDAME L. REV. 935,
976–78 (2016) (describing juries as “fully inscribed chalkboards filled with all sorts of precon-
ceived notions that affect their judgments about witnesses, facts, scientific evidence, and ulti-
mately their final verdicts”).
7 . See, e .g ., Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism’s Uneasy Re-
lationship with the Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 959, 966 (2010) (“The idealized modern jury . . . acts
as a blank slate upon which litigants may sketch their versions of the facts. The facts are the
focus because today’s ideal jurors are finders of fact only.”).
8 . See, e .g ., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
9. Vaise v. Delaval (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 944, 944 (KB).
10 . Id .
11. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRAILS AT COMMON LAW § 2352 (John T.
McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
12 . See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 857, 864–65 (2017) (noting the
widespread use of the jury no-impeachment rule).
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Courts could check the jury-selection process as well as the verdicts reached
but were unable to assess whether jurors actually reached their verdicts im-
partially. This is why the jury is colloquially referred to as a black box.
Because courts historically lacked the ability to review jury deliberations
for bias, the Constitution’s impartial jury mandate13 has taken form as
prophylactic guarantees. That is, courts have mandated certain processes de-
signed to procure what is likely to be an impartial jury. For instance, jurors
must be summoned according to principles of nondiscrimination14 and must
reflect a fair cross section of the community,15 and parties must be given op-
portunity to challenge jurors before the final verdict.16 But these prophylactic
safeguards offer a far-from-perfect solution. Jurors with improper biases,
both conscious and unconscious, still slip by and influence decisions. While
there is no way to confidently assert exactly how often this occurs, there is
strong reason to believe that biased juries pose a serious concern for the fair
administration of justice.17
The 2017 Supreme Court case Peña-Rodriguez v . Colorado addressed the
issue of juror bias during deliberations, with the Court adopting an expan-
sive new understanding of the impartial jury mandate.18 In that case, a Colo-
rado state jury found Mr. Peña-Rodriguez guilty of sexual assault. After the
verdict, two jurors told the defense attorney that another juror had purport-
edly stated that based on his experience as a former law enforcement officer,
“nine times out of ten Mexican men [are] guilty of being aggressive toward
women and young girls,” and concluded that “[Mr. Peña-Rodriguez] did it
because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want.”19 Mr. Pe-
ña-Rodriguez’s lawyers asked the trial judge to investigate the comments, but
the judge held that Colorado’s jury no-impeachment rule barred him from
13. This term refers collectively to the Constitution’s requirement that jurors in all con-
texts must sufficiently lack partiality. While there are distinctions in how this requirement is
realized in the civil, criminal, and grand jury contexts, these distinctions are not so significant
as to prevent recognition of and discussion on the Constitution’s overarching mandate. 12
LONNIE E. GRIFFITH, JR. ET AL., CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 48:62 (3d ed., 2018
update).
14 . See, e .g ., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
15 . See, e .g ., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986) (“[T]he Constitution presup-
poses that a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community is impartial . . . .”).
16 . See, e .g ., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 113–16, 127 (1987).
17 . See, e .g ., Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862; United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230,
1231–32 (10th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855 (quoting and describing
juror statements such as “[w]hen Indians get alcohol, they all get drunk,” “when they get
drunk, they get violent,” and “[we need to] send a message back to the reservation” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1156 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[The
Defendant’s] black and he sees a seventeen year old white girl—I know the type.” (quoting ju-
ror)).
18. 137 S. Ct. 855.
19 . Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862.
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doing so.20 Mr. Peña-Rodriguez petitioned up to the United States Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari and reversed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held that
where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on ra-
cial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth
Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to
permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and
any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.21
But the Court warned that “[n]ot every offhand comment . . . will justify set-
ting aside the no-impeachment bar;” rather, only those “showing that one or
more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious
doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and result-
ing verdict.”22 It stressed that the decision was limited to racial bias in crimi-
nal cases, noting the “unique historical, constitutional, and institutional con-
cerns” implicated by racism.23
Peña-Rodriguez v . Colorado represents a dramatic development in im-
partial jury mandate jurisprudence. Allowing judges to check jurors’ ration-
ales—rather than just the processes by which the jurors were selected and the
trial conducted—fundamentally alters what was previously thought the Con-
stitution mandated. Read broadly, Peña-Rodriguez seems to recognize a
Sixth Amendment right to have jury decisions made only according to con-
stitutionally permitted rationales.24 But questions persist. Most problemati-
cally, it remains unclear whether deliberations may be reviewed for bias
against other suspect and nonsuspect classes of individuals, or whether the
rule applies outside the criminal context. Moreover, the value of certain
prophylactic rules, such as peremptory challenges, might be suspect when
deliberations are reviewable. The case thus offers an opportunity to reassess
the many strands and motivations of the impartial jury mandate.
This Article addresses the Constitution’s jury requirements in light of
Peña-Rodriguez, with the treatment existing on two distinct levels. On the
most concrete plane, it offers a structural theory of the historical ex ante pro-
cedural and the newly formed ex post substantive components of the impar-
tial jury mandate, stressing that each of these advances a competing idea of
the jury’s institutional responsibilities. Yet on another level, the Article is
concerned with the broader implications of applying that new substantive
right and how it fits within existing notions of the jury as an institution. It
thus attempts to redirect the conversation on the role of the jury within the
judiciary, the federal structure, and society.
20 . Id .
21 . Id . at 869.
22 . Id .
23 . Id . at 868.
24 . Id . at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority decision sounds more
in the Equal Protection Clause than in the Sixth Amendment).
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To these ends, the Article is divided into four parts. Part I reviews the
emergence of the jury’s competing institutional responsibilities. It contends
that the transformation of the jury from a fact-knowing to a fact-finding in-
stitution precipitated the need for jurors who were unfamiliar with and neu-
tral in relation to the dispute.25 This transformation also granted jurors the
political power to deliver more easily verdicts against the weight of the facts,
law, or both.26 This political power proved attractive to the Founders of the
United States, who constitutionalized the jury in the Bill of Rights to serve as
a bulwark against powerful political and social actors.27 Since then, compet-
ing notions of impartiality have focused either on the jury’s responsibility as
a neutral dispenser of individualized justice or a politically active representa-
tive body.28
Part II analyzes and reframes the ex ante procedural aspects of the im-
partial jury mandate. It argues that by prohibiting review of the mental pro-
cesses by which jurors make their decisions, the jury no-impeachment rule
has required courts to enact imperfect prophylactic procedures aimed at se-
curing a jury that is likely, though by no means certain, to resolve disputes
with sufficient impartiality.29 These procedures are addressed in terms of
whether they occur pre- or post-venire. Pre-venire procedures are concerned
with empaneling a jury that will reflect society’s heterogeneity, whereas post-
venire procedures are concerned with ensuring that the selected jury will be
neutral in its decisionmaking.30
Next, Part III reviews the emergence and eventual recognition of an ex
post substantive component of the impartial jury mandate. It notes that
while the Supreme Court and others have long suggested that there may be
instances in which the no-impeachment rule must yield to address injustices,
it was not until Peña-Rodriguez that the Court identified such an instance.31
Up until this decision, all violations of the impartial jury right were framed
in terms of some failure of the prophylactic procedures. Peña-Rodriguez,
however, advances a new constitutional right to have a jury that is not mere-
ly selected according to pre- and post-venire mandates but rather to have a
jury that actually decides a case without extreme partiality—that is, at least
with respect to overt racial prejudices.32
25. David Torrance, Evidence, in TWO CENTURIES’ GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: 1701–
1901, at 319 (1901) (reviewing the jury’s transformation).
26 . See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
27 . See infra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
28 . See infra Section I.B.
29 . See, e .g ., James J. Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 269, 314 (1988) (“The need to focus on a priori juror impartiality stems from
the inability to examine the impartiality of the decision making process in the Anglo-American
legal system.”).
30 . See infra Section II.B.
31. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 866–69 (2017).
32 . See infra Section III.B.
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Finally, Part IV aims to contextualize ex post substantive review within
the Court’s impartial jury mandate jurisprudence. It contends that while the
Court is adamant that the Peña-Rodriguez holding is limited to racial bias,33
it is unlikely the Court can identify a limiting principle to exclude biases
against other classes. It suggests that the Equal Protection Clause’s tiers of
scrutiny offer guidance, recognizing that although concepts such as strict
scrutiny and rational basis are conceptually imperfect outside the legislative
context, they nevertheless provide direction for how to think about permis-
sible and impermissible jury biases.34 It concludes by arguing that ex ante
procedures and ex post substantive review can work together to balance the
jury’s competing responsibilities.
I. THE JURY’SCOMPETINGRESPONSIBILITIES
The jury is an ancient institution. While scholars debate its precise ori-
gins,35 most place the emergence of English common law juries at around the
time of the Norman Conquest.36 But to note this beginning without qualifi-
cation is misleading. As much as the jury is ancient, it is also ever-evolving.
Fundamental changes in the jury’s form and function have created an insti-
tution that is animated today by judicial and political responsibilities much
different than eight hundred years ago. Critically, these modern responsibili-
ties are in conflict. Today’s jury is expected to resolve the immediate dispute
without preconceptions, while also injecting a degree of democratic flexibil-
ity into the administration of law. Understanding the tension between these
two responsibilities is necessary to explain the difficulty in defining what the
Constitution requires when it guarantees an impartial jury. It is also central
to the structural theory presented here on how ex ante procedural and ex
post substantive tools work together to root out impermissible juror biases.
A. The Emergence of the Modern Jury
England did not always use juries. Through the turn of the first millen-
nium, disputes were mostly resolved through the imprecise and barbaric
practices of trial by ordeal, in which the accused was forced to prove his in-
nocence through withstanding some form of torture,37 and trial by combat,
33 . Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
34 . See infra Section IV.A.
35 . SeeWILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 2 (New York, James Cockcroft &
Co. 1875) (“Few subjects have exercised the ingenuity and baffled the research of the historian
more than the origin of the jury.”).
36 . See, e .g ., F.W.MAITLAND, THECONSTITUTIONALHISTORY OF ENGLAND 122 (1908).
37. For example, one common practice required the accused to carry in his bare hands a
red-hot iron and to some days later subject his wounds to inspection by a clergyman who
would determine whether they were sufficiently healed so as to prove him innocent. See Trisha
Olson, Of Enchantment: The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury Trial, 50 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 109, 117 (2000).
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in which two parties physically battled over property rights to the point of
death or embarrassment.38 Supernatural faith was the common foundation
of these practices, the prevailing thought being that God would vindicate the
innocent and punish the guilty.39 But this faith was undermined in 1215
when the Fourth Lateran Council forbade the clergy from further involve-
ment in these practices.40 Without divine sanction, trial by ordeal and battle
fell out of favor.41
A new form of dispute resolution was required. England turned to the
jury, which had been used for resolving certain land disputes since at least
1166.42 The jury was most likely selected because of a need to economize on
the time of professional judges. The administration of justice was an expen-
sive and time-consuming obligation for the medieval monarchy, and juries
were cheap.43 Local laypersons were hailed without pay to the courthouse
and questioned on their knowledge of the dispute.44 Evidence was not pro-
vided to those unfamiliar with the issues; instead, more and more people
were questioned until a body was formed that could competently resolve the
case.45 Professor Yeazell explains that this procedure “spared the judges the
task of hearing witnesses, sifting kernels of fact from the chaff of mutual per-
jury, and reconstructing events.”46 More importantly, it shifted the difficult
responsibility of passing judgment away from the monarch’s judges and onto
a local institution. Thus, a litigant would more aptly blame his countryman
rather than the Crown for an unfavorable verdict.47 And because evidence
was not presented in open court, litigants could not easily attack the jury’s
verdict as erroneous or perjurious.48
38. It was not uncommon for disputants to hire professional fighters to battle in their
stead. Because proficient fighters were more expensive, the individual with a greater financial
interest at stake was more likely to emerge victorious. See Peter T. Leeson, Trial by Battle, 3 J.
LEGALANALYSIS 341, 342 (2011).
39. Olson, supra note 37, at 118.
40 . See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 586 (1997).
41 . See JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 293 (1960).
42 . Id .
43 . Id . at 128 (“[T]he early common law jury was an essential means of conserving
trained manpower in a government that had taken on new tasks of immense scope and com-
plexity.”).
44. Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 87, 89–90.
45 . Id . at 91.
46 . Id . at 90.
47 . Id . This rationale persists. See United States ex rel . McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774,
776 (2d Cir. 1942) (discussing how jurors deflect responsibility away from judges).
48. Yeazell, supra note 44, at 91; see also John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness
to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 AM. J. LEGALHIST. 201, 203
(1988) (explaining that jurors could be punished through the attaint process–similar to per-
jury–where if a second jury “found that the first jury had erred, the members of the first jury
were punished severely”).
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Over time, the practice of selecting jurors with preexisting knowledge of
the dispute became increasingly onerous. Sometimes it was not possible to
find twelve people acquainted with the facts, while at other times there were
far more than twelve with relevant knowledge.49 It became common for ju-
rors to informally consult witnesses and other outside information before
rendering their verdicts.50 By the fourteenth century, this process of interro-
gation was becoming formalized, with both jurors and witnesses appearing
before the court either together or as distinct groups.51 The subsequent three
centuries saw the development of more modern trial practices, such as liti-
gants nominating witnesses to testify, the court compelling attendance, and
counsel cross-examination.52 With these developments, the jury’s function
gradually shifted away from fact-knowing and toward fact-finding.53 By at
least 1670 the transformation was complete; for instance, Chief Justice of
Common Pleas John Vaughan could easily distinguish between witnesses
and jurors: “[A] witness swears but to what he hath heard or seen . . . . But a
jury-man swears to what he can inferr [sic] and conclude from the testimony
of such witnesses, by the act and force of his understanding, to be the fact
inquired after . . . .”54
Employing jurors as fact-finders carried a number of unintended conse-
quences, two of which are important for our discussion.55 First, it became
necessary to ensure that the selected jurors were capable of making determi-
nations without favor toward the litigants. Writing in the eighteenth century,
William Blackstone explained that “if a juror knows any thing of the matter
in issue, he may be sworn as a witness and give his evidence publicly in
court.”56 And around the same time, the requirement that jurors come from
the local community was eliminated, and jurors began to be selected at
large.57 William Blackstone, again, explained: “Common law required the ju-
49 . SeeW.R. CORNISH, THE JURY 11, 275 (1968).
50 . SeeMitnick, supra note 48, at 204.
51 . Id .
52 . Id .
53. Torrance, supra note 25, at 321 (“This radical change . . . came about quite gradual-
ly, and it is probably as difficult to determine the exact time when it became complete as it is to
determine at what precise moment daylight ends and darkness begins.”).
54. Bushell’s Case (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1009. Even at this time, however, the court
allowed jurors to draw upon their own knowledge to some degree. Indeed, in the same deci-
sion quoted above, the Chief Justice wrote, “To what end must hundredors be of the jury,
whom the law supposeth to have nearer knowledge of the fact than those of the vicinage in
general?” Id . at 1012. On this basis, he concluded that it was inappropriate to punish jurors for
decisions against the evidence, because judges “know[] not what [the evidence] is.” Id . at 1013.
The tension between whether a juror must disregard his personal knowledge in place of the
evidence presented at trial has long been central to the institution.
55. Yeazell, supra note 44, at 88 (“[T]he designers of the jury did not attempt to create a
complex political institution.”).
56. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *375.
57 . SeeMitnick, supra note 48, at 204–05.
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ries to be brought from the vicinage; because they were supposed to know
the facts[;] But . . . this is changed, because it is found that such jurors were
apt to intermix their prejudices and partialities in the trial of right.”58 The
ideal juror had become one unacquainted with the parties or their dispute
and entirely removed from the pending resolution. If a juror had nothing to
gain, it was thought that he would determine the case truthfully.59
The second critical result of the jury’s shift to a fact-finding body was
that the institution came to harness great political power. Unlocked from the
requirement that their verdicts be based on personal knowledge, jurors could
more readily reach outcomes that were contrary to the law, the facts, or
both.60 They often did so to soften aspects of the law. As Professor Green ex-
plains, “Jury discretion was most common in cases of sudden, unplanned
homicides and in thefts that did not involve physical violence or housebreak-
ing. In these cases . . . juries frequently manipulated the fact-finding process
to prevent the imposition of capital punishment.”61 By exercising authority
over facts, jurors could throttle justice in favor or against litigants that it
found so deserving, or even with total caprice. In this way, the jury’s control
over the facts became control over law. The institution’s political power was
growing.
This political power proved particularly attractive across the Atlantic,
where American colonists were becoming increasingly discontented with the
Crown. The jury proved to be one of the core channels through which colo-
nists could exert local, democratic authority against the distant, unrepre-
sentative monarchy. The most famous example of this might be the seditious
libel case of John Peter Zenger,62 but instances of jury activism were frequent
in the run-up to the Revolution. Colonists regularly used the jury both de-
fensively and offensively to challenge the Crown. Defensively, colonial juries
would refuse to enforce penalties against smugglers who evaded payment of
taxes and tariffs.63 Offensively, those same smugglers would often subject of-
58. BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *360.
59. As Lord Coke famously described, a juror should be “indifferent as he stands un-
sworn.” 3 J.H. THOMAS ET AL., COKE’S FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 400 (1818).
60 . See THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200–1800, at 241, 254 (1985). True,
some juries going back centuries had acted with obstinacy. But by this time, developments in
the common law prevented judges from punishing jurors or requiring them to provide ration-
ales for their verdicts, meaning that jurors could more easily flex their institutional muscles.
See id . at 200; Edmund M. Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogato-
ries, 32 YALE L.J. 575, 591 (1923).
61. GREEN, supra note 60, at xv.
62 . See generally JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF
JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL (Stanley Nider Katz ed.,
1963) (reviewing the circumstances of the case and noting that it was widely celebrated at the
time as a turning point in the sentiment against the Crown).
63 . See, e .g ., STEPHEN BOTEIN, EARLYAMERICAN LAWAND SOCIETY 57 (1983).
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ficers to private lawsuits for damages attendant to searches.64 So intransigent
were colonial juries that one governor complained, “[A] trial by jury here is
only trying one illicit trader by his fellows, or at least by his well-wishers.”65
Following the Revolutionary War and the short-lived Articles of Con-
federation, the Framers cemented the jury’s political power in the Constitu-
tion and in three separate amendments. The jury was anticipated to serve as
a bulwark against the new federal government, much in the same way that it
had against the Crown.66 Indeed, before the Bill of Rights, anti-federalists
wrote frequently on the parade of horribles that would result if the federal
government were not constrained by local jurymen.67 And one of the most
popular criticisms lobbed against the initial Constitution was its lack of civil
jury protections.68 For these reasons, Professor Amar has described the jury
as “a paradigmatic image underlying the original Bill of Rights” and noted
that the jury’s initial “absence strongly influenced the judge-restricting doc-
trines underlying [the First, Fourth, and Eighth] amendments.”69 Similarly,
Professor Thomas has likened the jury to a governmental “branch” in that it
is responsible for balancing abuses by the executive, legislature, and judici-
ary.70 In this way, the jury was established as a critical component of the con-
stitutional framework.
Beyond the authority to check abuses of power, the jury was also seen as
an opportunity for local involvement in the administration of the new gov-
ernment. As historian Herbert Storing argues, “The question [at the found-
ing] was not fundamentally whether the lack of adequate provision for jury
trial would weaken a traditional bulwark of individual rights (although that
was also involved) but whether it would fatally weaken the role of the people
in the administration of government.”71 French sociologist Alexis de
64. That famously occurred in Erving v . Cradock, Quincy 553 (Mass. 1761). There, a
civil jury awarded large damages against a customs officer who seized the plaintiff’s ship pur-
suant to a writ of assistance from the Court of Admiralty, despite the plaintiff’s admission that
he was liable for forfeiture. See JOSIAHQUINCY, JR.,Notes on Erving v. Cradock, in REPORTS OF
CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE JUDICATURE OF THE
PROVINCE OFMASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 553, 557 (Samuel M. Quincy
ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1865).
65 . See BOTEIN, supra note 63, at 57 (quoting Governor William Shirley).
66 . See, e .g ., 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 64 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); Edith
Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 298
(1966).
67 . See, e .g ., Essay of a Democratic Federalist, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 66, at 58, 61 (“[If an officer searching] for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a
bed in which there was a woman, and searched under her shift . . . a trial by jury would be our
safest resource . . . .”).
68 . See, e .g ., THE FEDERALISTNO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
69. AKHIL REEDAMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 96 (1998).
70. SUJAA. THOMAS, THEMISSINGAMERICAN JURY 84 (2016).
71. THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 66, at 19 (emphasis omitted); see also
AMAR, supra note 69, at 97 (“The jury summed up—indeed embodied—the ideals of populism,
federalism, and civic virtue that were the essence of the original Bill of Rights.”).
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Tocqueville recognized this same sentiment. He famously described the jury
as a distinctly political institution that teaches citizens how to engage in par-
ticipatory democracy.72 This is perhaps why serving on a jury has been a
hard-fought civil right through much of the United States’ blemished histo-
ry.73 To be a juror in America is a political designation: it is to be a constitu-
tionally recognized participant in the state.
As this concise historical review shows, the American jury occupies a
unique position in the constitutional structure and carries competing re-
sponsibilities. At its most basic, the jury is an adjudicative actor entrusted
with resolving private and public disputes. But inherent to exercising this re-
sponsibility, the jury shapes the law and its application. This power was writ-
ten into the Constitution and inures the jury with an import that extends be-
yond mere dispute resolution. Any concept of impartiality must account for
all for this.
B. The Difficulty with Defining Impartiality
Courts have struggled to advance a cohesive definition of impartiality
that can reflect the jury’s competing responsibilities.74 There is general
agreement that a juror should not have a personal interest in the outcome of
the particular case. She should not, for instance, be familiarly related to the
litigants or stand to personally gain from the resolution.75 Similarly, she
should not have formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief about
the specific matter in advance of the trial.76 But underlying this base consen-
sus is disagreement over the degree to which jurors must be devoid of all
general opinions and whether jurors can draw upon their opinions to deci-
pher the facts and apply the law.
On one side of the debate are pure jury formalists. Formalists view the
jury as a fact-finding body in which facts are a set of discoverable, objective
phenomena that jurors of different backgrounds will perceive similarly.77
The jurors’ unique experiences are unnecessary because outside information
72. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 274 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 2000) (1838).
73 . See, e .g ., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Jury as Constitutional Identity, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1105, 1115–34 (2014) (reviewing the expansion of the civil right to serve as a
juror).
74. Howe, supra note 4, at 1183 (“A brief, self-explanatory standard appears impossible
to provide.”).
75 . See VALERIE P. HANS&NEILVIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 35–37 (1986).
76 . See, e .g ., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g)
(“The jury should enter upon the trial with minds open to those impressions which the testi-
mony and the law of the case ought to make, not with those preconceived opinions which will
resist those impressions.”).
77. Burt Neuborne, Essay, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism,
Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 443 (1992).
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is irrelevant to the dispute.78 For example, consider the jury charges from
Eastern District of California Judge Garland Burrell:
[B]eing a juror is hard . . . because it’s probably the only time in your life
that you are ever asked to take all of you[r] experiences . . . that have con-
tributed to how you think about everything . . . and to lay those experiences
aside . . . . We call them your biases and your prejudices, and we all have
them. . . . [B]ut you can’t depend upon them when you are jurors.79
To such formalists, the jury is a passive administrative body, silently examin-
ing evidence and delivering dispassionate outcomes.80 The Supreme Court
has at times championed this approach, stating, “An impartial jury consists
of nothing more than ‘jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find
the facts.’ ”81 It has further claimed that the jury must be “capable and willing
to decide the case solely on the evidence before it.”82
On the other side of the debate are pure jury realists. Realists view facts
as malleable and reality as constructed by the experiences of decisionmak-
ers.83 They argue that one need not regress to solipsism to acknowledge that
a person’s understanding about the world is built on that individual’s experi-
ential background.84 To realists, the jurors’ general biases are precisely the
institution’s strength as a representative body. For instance, consider the jury
charges of California State Court Judge Judith Champagne:
You are going to judge whether or not the testimony is reliable . . . . makes
sense . . . . [and] is reasonable. You are going to do probably what you do
regularly in your normal lives, which is to take in information, assess it us-
ing common sense and then make decisions. There is nothing magical
about your jobs here.85
To such realists, the jury represents the community’s wisdom. The Supreme
Court has championed this perspective at times, too.86 It has supported the
78. NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 105 (2005) (“[T]he traditional view of the
juror’s role throughout trial is that of an empty vessel into which information presented in the
form of exhibits, testimony, argument, and judicial instructions will be poured.”).
79. Taylor v. Sisto, 606 F.3d 622, 623 (9th Cir. 2010).
80 . See Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding
Cases, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 190, 198 (1990) (“[J]urors are expected to silently examine and listen
carefully to all of the evidence, and then to evaluate that evidence during the deliberation phase
of the trial.”).
81. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985)).
82. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
83 . See Neuborne, supra note 77, at 443.
84 . See id .
85. Victorian v. Cash, No. CV 07–5514 JVS (FMO), 2011 WL 4337131, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 8, 2011) (emphasis omitted).
86 . See, e .g ., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (“[T]he proper functioning
of the jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a ‘body truly rep-
resentative of the community’ . . . [that] comport[s] with the concept of the jury as a cross-
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notion of “diffused impartiality”87 and recognized that “the counterbalancing
of various biases is critical to the accurate application of the common sense
of the community to the facts of any given case.”88 And it has concluded that
“the Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross section of
the community is impartial.”89
Although the formalist and realist approaches are diametrically opposed,
these Janus-faced articulations should not surprise. Neither a purely formal-
ist nor purely realist approach would accurately reflect the responsibilities of
the jury both to ensure individualized justice and to provide for the political
capacity of the institution. If jurors were permitted to consult all their biases,
trials would be unrestrained and lack even a veneer of ordered justice. As the
Seventh Circuit noted, “The [Constitution] protect[s] . . . from a jury’s lynch
mob mentality through the guarantees of due process of law and trial by an
impartial jury.”90 Alternatively, even if the Court wanted to privilege a neu-
tral body over a representative one, it is unclear that such a jury could exist.91
“[A]lthough absolute justice may require as much,” Judge Learned Hand
once explained, “it would be impracticable to impose the counsel of absolute
perfection that no verdict shall stand, unless every juror has been entirely
without bias, and has based his vote only upon evidence he has heard in
court.”92 Judge Hand voiced his suspicion that few verdicts would withstand
such a test, which he noted “has induced judges to take a middle course.”93
Further complicating the definition of juror impartiality is that many
aspects of the law anticipate and invite jurors to bring their outside
knowledge to bear on a given dispute. These include, but are not limited to,
framing the profile of negligence or causation in tort and criminal law94 and
the very definition of obscenity.95 In these areas, “[t]he biases of the commu-
nity are in effect the legal standard.”96 But even beyond these specific areas of
law, the jury’s untrained and often-biased eye is anticipated to ensure the
section of the community.” (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940))); see also Spazi-
ano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 486–87 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[Jurors] reflect more accurately the composition and experiences of the community as a
whole, and inevitably make decisions based on community values more reliably, than can that
segment of the community that is selected for service on the bench.”).
87 . See, e .g ., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co.,
328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
88. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978).
89. Lockhart v. McCree 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986).
90. United States v. McClinton, 135 F.3d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir. 1998).
91 . See, e .g ., Howe, supra note 4, at 1190 (“Efforts to enforce a highly exacting standard
of juror impartiality would require exclusion of almost most potential jurors in many cases.”).
92. Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1947).
93 . Id .
94. Gobert, supra note 29, at 304 n.158.
95 . Id .
96 . Id . at 280.
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community’s sense of justice.97 Jurors are expected to humanize the law,
translating complicated legal standards into applicable rules.98 As Second
Circuit Judge Jerome Frank recognized, “[the decisionmaker who] strips
himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking machine” and
thereby “ceases to be human.”99 To some degree, the jurors’ biases are a fea-
ture, not a bug.
As such, a single definition of impartiality confounds. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, bias is “such an elusive condition of the mind that it is
most difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize its existence.”100 And
even if it were recognized, as other judges have noted, “[t]he point at which
an impression too weak to warp the judgment ends and one too strong to
suppress begins is difficult to discern.”101 Moreover, increasing amounts of
social science show that most forms of bias are implicit, covertly influencing
jurors’ thought processes and difficult to root out.102 Perhaps the best that
can be said is that an impartial jury is one in which the composite jurors are
drawn fairly and do not allow their inherent biases to irrationally affect their
verdict.103 Yet even this broad definition is unhelpful if courts cannot em-
97 . See 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 349 (3d ed. 1922) (“[The
jury system] tends to make the law intelligible by keeping it in touch with the common facts of
life. . . . The jury system has for some hundreds of years been constantly bringing the rules of
law to the touchstone of contemporary common sense.”).
98. As Albert W. Dzur explains,
By empowering outsiders, the jury trial injects a decalcifying antidote into the cir-
culatory system of modern criminal justice. Pressing courthouse regulars to trans-
late their language and share their ideas and experiences with lay citizens, forcing
significant interaction between professionals and laypeople, the jury renders
transparent the complicated norms, rules, and procedures best understood in
practice.
ALBERTW.DZUR, PUNISHMENT, PARTICIPATORYDEMOCRACY, AND THE JURY 102 (2012).
99 . In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652–53 (2d Cir. 1943) (making this point with
respect to judges, rather than jurors).
100. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 231 (1982) (quoting Crawford v. United States, 212
U.S. 183, 196 (1909)).
101. Briley v. Commonwealth, 279 S.E.2d 151, 154 (Va. 1981). This point will be dis-
cussed in depth infra Part IV.
102 . See, e .g ., Laurie A. Rudman et al., “Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Malleability of
Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 856, 856 (2001).
103. Others have offered similar formulations. See Gobert, supra note 29, at 326 (“To be
impartial is to assume a role which the legal system asks a juror to play.”); Howe, supra note 4,
at 1183 (“[P]ersons who establish themselves in advance as likely to be strongly influenced by
information gained extrajudicially regarding important factual issues, as likely to decide the
case primarily on offensive, personal considerations or as likely to fail to consider relevant, in-
court arguments, warrant a finding of bias.”); see also Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 232
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The object is to devise a [jury] system that is fairly repre-
sentative of our variegated population, exacts the obligation of citizenship to share in the ad-
ministration of justice without operating too harshly upon any section of the community, and
is duly regardful of the public interest in matters outside the jury system.”).
728 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:713
panel such a jury. Our conversation turns next to how courts have historical-
ly tried to do so.
II. IMPARTIALITY AS EXANTE PROCEDURE
The Supreme Court has recognized that “for the ascertainment of . . . the
prospective juror[’s] [impartiality], the Constitution lays down no particular
tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula.”104
The key word here is prospective. This ex ante viewpoint results from the fact
that judges have been for hundreds of years rigidly prohibited from review-
ing jury deliberations.105 Locked out of the deliberation room, courts have
read the impartial jury mandate as requiring certain prophylactic procedures
that are thought to secure a body that is likely to be impartial.106 These pro-
cedures are best discussed in terms of whether they occur pre-venire or post-
venire formation. Generally, pre-venire procedures aim to secure a repre-
sentative, realist-type jury, while post-venire procedures aim to secure a neu-
tral, formalist-type jury.107
A. The Jury No-Impeachment Rule
The common law rule that a judge will not hear juror testimony im-
peaching the jury’s verdict originated in 1785. In Vaise v . Delaval, two jurors
attempted to submit affidavits swearing that the jury broke their deadlocked
deliberations by flipping a coin.108 Lord Mansfield refused, ruling that “[t]he
Court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the jurymen themselves,
in all of whom such conduct is a very high misdemeanor.”109 Mansfield’s de-
cision was founded on the civil law maxim nemo turpitudinem suam allegans
audietur, or “a witness shall not be heard to allege his own turpitude.”110 Be-
cause it was illegal for jurors to resolve their disagreement by a game of
chance, their affidavits amounted to confessions of a crime.
Lord Mansfield’s application of this maxim broke with precedent. As
Professor Wigmore notes in his prominent evidence treatise, “Up to Lord
Mansfield’s time, and within a half decade of his decision in Vaise v . Delaval,
104. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145–46 (1936).
105 . See, e .g ., Gobert, supra note 29, at 314 (“The need to focus on a priori juror impar-
tiality stems from the inability to examine the impartiality of the decision making process in
the Anglo-American legal system.”).
106 . See id . at 312 (“The Supreme Court’s approach to impartiality has been one of indi-
rection.”).
107. Other scholars have discussed these various procedures in terms of securing “group-
impartiality” and “individual impartiality.” See, e .g ., Howe, supra note 4, at 1179–80, 1203. This
approach is inadequate because it fails to acknowledge how these concepts tie into the jury’s
competing responsibilities.
108. Vaise v. Delaval (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (KB).
109 . Id . at 944 (citations omitted).
110 . SeeWIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2352 (emphasis omitted).
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the unquestioned practice had been to receive jurors’ testimony or affidavits
without scruple.”111 In fact, not long after the decision, one New York judge
facetiously queried, “If a man will voluntarily charge himself with a misde-
meanor, why should he not be indulged? Are not criminals in England every
day convicted, and even executed, on their own confession? And is not our
state-prison filled in the same way?”112 Such pushback was generally limited,
however, and the jury no-impeachment became ingrained in the common
law and embraced in the United States.113
By the twentieth century, Lord Mansfield’s original and suspect rationale
was replaced with new public policy considerations.114 In 1915, the Supreme
Court comprehensively articulated these policies in McDonald v . Pless when
it refused to accept juror testimony that a civil damage award was deter-
mined by quotient verdict.115 The Court stressed that it was pulled “between
redressing the injury of the private litigant and inflicting the public inju-
ry.”116 It then described three public injuries associated with admitting juror
testimony. First, discarding the rule would threaten the finality of verdicts
“solemnly made and publicly returned” by making deliberations the “con-
stant subject of public investigation.”117 Second, it would result in jurors be-
ing “harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from
them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set
aside a verdict.”118 Finally, it would destroy the “frankness and freedom of
discussion and conference” during what was meant to be a private delibera-
tion.119 The Court concluded that although the jury had “adopted an arbi-
trary and unjust method in arriving at their verdict,” upholding the jury no-
impeachment rule was the “the lesser of two evils.”120
Note, however, that the no-impeachment rule has never been an abso-
lute bar on evidence derived from within the jury room. The most important
carve-out federal courts have recognized is for “extraneous influences.” This
carve-out includes evidence of bribery or intimidation of jurors and extends
to any other improper communication that crosses the formal boundaries
protecting deliberation.121 For instance, in Mattox v . United States, the court
accepted testimony that the jury consulted an inflammatory newspaper ac-
111 . Id .
112 . See Smith v. Cheetham, 3 Cai. 57, 59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (emphasis omitted).
113 . SeeWIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2352.
114 . See id .
115. Each of the jurors had written down the sum to which he thought the plaintiff was
entitled, from which an average was determined and ultimately awarded. See 238 U.S. 264,
265–66 (1915).
116 . McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267.
117 . Id . at 267–68.
118 . Id . at 267.
119 . Id . at 267–68.
120 . Id . at 267.
121 . SeeWIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2354.
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count of the trial,122 and in Wheaton v . United States, the court accepted evi-
dence that the bailiff engaged the jury in discussion of the case.123 Critically,
a distinction is drawn between the specific influence and its effect on the ju-
ror.124 As the Supreme Court explained, “[A juror] may testify to any facts
bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, alt-
hough not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind.”125 This
limitation is paramount. The Court has historically refused to assess the ba-
sis and propriety of jurors’ decisionmaking. With extraneous influences, it is
the procedural breach that is problematic, not the substantive effect upon the
decisionmakers.
This approach remained largely unquestioned at the federal level until
the 1970s when it wavered slightly. At the time, a number of state legislatures
and courts had begun recognizing additional exceptions to the no-
impeachment rule, including exceptions for juror bias.126 In the debate sur-
rounding the initial Federal Rules of Evidence, the House of Representatives
supported recognizing new exceptions to the no-impeachment rule, while
the Senate preferred the common law approach.127 Ultimately, the Confer-
ence Committee sided with the Senate, adopting Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b). That rule forbids jurors from testifying as to “any matter or state-
ment occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect
of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing
the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning
the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith.”128 However, three lim-
ited exceptions were added to the traditional common law approach—jurors
may testify as to whether “[1] extraneous prejudicial information was im-
properly brought to the jury’s attention; [2] an outside influence was im-
properly brought to bear on any juror; or [3] a mistake was made in entering
the verdict on the verdict form.”129 Some federal courts have stretched the
“extraneous prejudicial information” exception to reach instances of partiali-
ty during deliberations,130 but generally the exceptions have been narrowly
applied.
122. 146 U.S. 140, 148 (1892).
123. 133 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1943).
124 . See Mattox, 146 U.S. at 150.
125 . Id . at 149.
126 . See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 876 (2017). The most popular of
these alternatives is the Iowa Rule, which allows judges to accept juror testimony of “overt
acts . . . accessible to the knowledge of all the jurors.” This would include quotient verdicts, for
instance. See Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 544–45 (1874).
127. S. REP. NO. 93-1277 (1974).
128. FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (1975) (amended 2011).
129. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(A)–(C) (note that the third exception, for basic mistakes,
was not added until the amendments of 2006).
130 . See infra Section III.A.
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Although the common law no-impeachment rule is now reflected in
Rule 606(b), it would be specious to conclude that it is similar in kind to oth-
er evidentiary rules. To the contrary, the rule continues to reflect deep-
rooted concerns about the jury as an institution and the need for independ-
ence and finality in decisionmaking.131 As such, the Supreme Court has re-
mained exceedingly reluctant to impeach jury verdicts.132 Famously, in Tan-
ner v . United States, the Court refused to accept juror testimony that several
jurors had “consumed alcohol during the lunch breaks . . . causing them to
sleep through the afternoons,” and that some had smoked cannabis and in-
gested cocaine during the trial.133 Even in the face of this incredible circum-
stance, the Supreme Court repeated the common law refrain that
“[s]ubstantial policy considerations support the common law rule against the
admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict.”134 It further warned of the
slippery slope flowing from an alternative result, stating that it is “not at all
clear . . . that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.”135
This last point is worth stressing. By denying all forms of jury impeach-
ment based on jurors’ mental processes, the Court has been relieved of the
problematic task of dividing between permissible and impermissible biases
influencing deliberations.136 The no-impeachment rule privileges the jury’s
independence as an institution over the litigants’ interest in individualized
justice. True, courts have long overturned verdicts that are against the weight
of the evidence.137 But the no-impeachment rule prevents them from know-
ing whether seemingly accurate verdicts were achieved in a partial way.
Without that knowledge, courts have sought impartiality through alternative
means.
B. Procedures Tending to Secure an Impartial Jury
Locked out of reviewing the basis upon which jurors make their deci-
sions, Courts have read the impartial jury mandate as requiring a number of
prophylactic procedures. These procedures are best discussed in terms of
whether they are required before or after venire formation. Pre–venire for-
131 . See United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Pe-
ña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (“Rule 606(b) is a rule of evidence, but its role
in the criminal justice process is substantive: it insulates the deliberations of the jury from sub-
sequent second-guessing by the judiciary.”).
132 . See, e .g ., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Perempto-
ry Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 218 (1989) (describing
the courts’ “failure to hold jurors to ordinary standards of responsibility”).
133. 483 U.S. 107, 113–16 (1987).
134 . Tanner, 483 U.S. at 119.
135 . Id . at 120.
136 . See Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 360, 366 (1958) (ar-
guing that the jury no-impeachment rule may be “explained as a substitute for a more restric-
tive rule concerning the grounds for impeachment”).
137. This power did not exist at common law. See THOMAS, supra note 70, at 80–82.
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mation, the Constitution requires that citizens be hailed into court according
to principles of nondiscrimination and that juries must reflect a “fair cross
section” of the community. The Court has championed these procedures as
necessary to secure a jury that can fulfill its responsibility as a democratic
and representative body. Once the venire is formed, however, a different set
of procedures is required, most importantly the voir dire process of individ-
ual jury selection. It is believed that these procedures make it more likely that
the resulting jury will be capable of dispassionately applying the law to the
facts.138
1. Pre-Venire Procedures
For a jury to be constitutionally impartial, the venire from which it is
empaneled must reflect a fair cross section of the community.139 Indeed, “the
Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross section of the
community is impartial.”140 This notion reflects the realist principle that the
jury is a democratic decisionmaking body and therefore must be representa-
tive of society’s heterogeneity. The Court has at various times recognized this
principle as part of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as
well as the impartial jury mandate.
That a jury must reflect society was first recognized following the Civil
War. In a groundbreaking 1880 case, Strauder v . West Virginia, the Supreme
Court struck down a state law that deliberately excluded blacks from veni-
res.141 The Court based its reasoning on the notion that black jurors were
more likely to be prejudiced in favor of the black defendants, writing, “It is
well known that prejudices often exist against particular classes in the com-
munity, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate in
some cases to deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that pro-
tection which others enjoy.”142 The Court added: “[B]y reason of his being a
colored man . . . he had reason to believe . . . he could not have the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings . . . for the security of his person as
is enjoyed by white citizens.”143 Thus, because a white defendant would be
entitled to have jurors biased to his benefit, the disparate treatment of the
138 . Compare Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978) (accepting in the context of
pre-venire procedures that “the counterbalancing of various biases is critical to the accurate
application of the common sense of the community to the facts of any given case”), with Lock-
hart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 177–78 (1986) (rejecting in the context of post-venire procedures
the notion that “because all individual jurors are to some extent predisposed towards one result
or another, a constitutionally impartial jury can be constructed only by ‘balancing’ the various
predispositions of the individual jurors” (emphasis omitted)).
139 . See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
140 . See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 187.
141. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
142 . Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
143 . Id . at 304.
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black defendant denied him equal protection under the recently ratified
Fourteenth Amendment.
In the decades following, the Supreme Court recognized the exclusion
from juries of other “identifiable groups” as unconstitutional.144 In the pro-
cess, however, the Court began to move away from the nondiscrimination
principle of Strauder and highlight the representative nature of the jury as a
political body.145 In Glasser v . United States, a 1942 case, the Court stated that
to be a “body truly representative of the community,” a jury must reflect a
“cross-section of the community.”146 This was the first time the Court recog-
nized a fair-cross-section requirement in the Constitution.147 It was unclear
at the time whether this requirement was derived from the Equal Protection
Clause, or if the concept of the word “jury” as used in the Fifth, Sixth, and
Seventh Amendments required this kind of representation.148 It was not until
1975 that the Court explicitly recognized that “the selection of a petit jury
from a representative cross section of the community is an essential compo-
nent of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial” and that “the exclusion [of
certain classes] deprives a criminal defendant of his . . . right to trial by an
impartial jury.”149 The Court’s language further made clear that grand and
civil juries must also reflect a fair cross section of the community.150
Critically, these fair-cross-section decisions did not draw upon the ste-
reotype that the excluded class would harbor beneficial bias toward litigants
of the same class, as was the reasoning in Strauder. Instead, the decisions
were guided by the notion of “diffused impartiality.”151 This idea first
emerged in Ballard v . United States, decided in 1946, in which women were
systematically excluded from the jury pool.152 Justice Douglas of the majority
wrote: “To insulate the courtroom from either [sex] may not in a given case
make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is
excluded.”153 And nearly thirty years later, the Court expounded:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded
from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of
human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is un-
known and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the ex-
144. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477–78 (1954).
145. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (noting that the jury must be “a body truly
representative of the community”).
146. 315 U.S. 60, 85–86 (1942).
147 . Glasser, 315 U.S. at 85–86.
148 . Id . at 85 (stating that notions of what a “proper jury is have developed in harmony
with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government”).
149. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528, 535–36 (1975) (emphasis added).
150 . See id .
151 . Id . at 530–31 (citing Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
152. 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
153 . Ballard, 329 U.S. at 194.
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cluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do,
that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that
may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.154
The Court thus recognized that it is through the deliberative, interactive pro-
cess that the jury delivers its wisdom. As such, “the counterbalancing of var-
ious biases is critical to the accurate application of the common sense of the
community to the facts of any given case.”155
Those classes of individuals who sufficiently add to deliberations that
they cannot be excluded without violating the impartial jury mandate are
called “distinctive groups.”156 This concept differs from suspect classes in
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, although there is considerable over-
lap and courts often equivocate between the two.157 This confusion is likely
because, as the Supreme Court has admitted, it has “never attempted to pre-
cisely define the term ‘distinctive group.’ ”158 Instead, it has offered a rather
unhelpful three-prong test: first, “the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘dis-
tinctive’ group in the community”; second, “the representation of this group
in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation
to the number of such persons in the community”; and third, “this un-
derrepresentation is due to systemic exclusion of the group in the jury-
selection process.”159 Officially, the Court has only recognized race,160 gen-
der,161 and ethnic background162 as “distinctive groups”; however, it has sug-
gested that other immutable characteristics might qualify as well.163 If a de-
fendant makes out a prima facie case that a distinctive group has been
excluded, states must show a significant interest in intentionally or uninten-
tionally excluding this group.164
154. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J.).
155. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978).
156. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363–64 (1979).
157 . See Sanjay K. Chhablani, Re-Framing the ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement, 13 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 931, 947 (2011).
158. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986).
159 . Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
160 . See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J.).
161 . See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975).
162 . See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
163 . See, e .g ., Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 176 (upholding exclusions based on ideology because
they “are singled out for exclusion . . . on the basis of an attribute that is within the individual’s
control”). Courts have at various times upheld the exclusion of “old people, poor people, deaf
people, less educated people, college students, resident aliens, blue-collar workers, professional
workers, felons, juvenile offenders, those not registered to vote, those opposed to the death
penalty, those affiliated with the National Rifle Association, city residents, and residents of
Minneapolis.” See Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A
Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 968–69 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
164 . See, e .g ., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 533 (discussing a state’s possible justification in exclud-
ing women from jury selection).
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The policy considerations motivating these procedural requirements at
the pre-venire stage fall firmly into the realist conception of the jury as a
democratic political institution. At various times the court has explained that
the fair-cross-section requirement “guard[s] against the exercise of arbitrary
power” by ensuring that “commonsense judgment of the community” will
act as “a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor.”165 The
Court has also stressed that representation bolsters the public’s confidence in
procedural justice166 and implements the belief that “sharing in the admin-
istration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.”167 Without being able to
review jury deliberations to ensure impartial decisionmaking, these pre-
venire procedures act as imperfect tools to empower the jury as an inde-
pendent constitutional entity. They attempt to secure a body that can draw
upon its inherent biases to administer the law in line with local concepts of
justice. And they privilege the idea that different individuals will decide cases
differently.
2. Post-Venire Procedures
Once the venire is assembled, the fair-cross-section requirement and its
motivations fall away completely.168 The Supreme Court has been over-
whelmingly clear that there is “no requirement that petit juries actually cho-
sen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in
the population.”169 “[I]f it were true that the Constitution required a certain
mix of individual viewpoints on the jury,” the Court has reasoned, “then trial
judges would be required to undertake the Sisyphean task of ‘balancing’ ju-
ries, making sure that each contains the proper number of Democrats and
Republicans, young persons and old persons, white-collar executives and
blue-collar laborers.”170 At the post-venire stage, distinct procedures reflect-
ing a formalist conception of the jury as a neutral arbiter are implicated.
“[T]he quest is for jurors who will consciously apply the law and find the
facts,” the Court has said, as “[t]hat is what an ‘impartial’ jury consists of.”171
The key procedure here is voir dire. This process of questioning poten-
tial jurors about biases that may be implicated during the trial “plays a criti-
cal function in assuring the criminal defendant that his . . . right to an impar-
165 . Id . at 530.
166 . Id .
167 . Id . at 531.
168 . See, e .g ., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 477–83 (1990) (rejecting “an extension of
the fair-cross-section requirement from the venire to the petit jury,” and noting that “[t]he
‘representativeness’ constitutionally required at the venire stage can be disrupted at the jury-
panel stage to serve a State’s ‘legitimate interest.’ ” (quoting Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175)).
169 . Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
170. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986).
171. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985).
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tial jury will be honored.”172 Disqualifying biases are either actual or im-
plied.173 Actual bias “involves a determination of the juror’s subjective state
of mind, which normally turns on . . . the juror’s own admission or denial of
bias,” whereas implied bias turns on an “objective determination
of . . . whether the average man in the juror’s situation could render an im-
partial verdict.”174 For instance, the Court has explained: “[Disqualifying bi-
as] might exist in the mind of one . . . who was quite positive that he had no
bias, and said that he was perfectly able to decide the question wholly unin-
fluenced by anything but the evidence,” and so “bias is implied, and evidence
of its actual existence need not be given.”175
Courts will strike individuals if their preconceptions appear to be so
strong that they will not be overcome by evidence offered during the trial.176
As Chief Justice Marshall explained back in the 1807 case of the infamous
Aaron Burr:
The opinion which has been avowed by the court is, that light impressions
which may fairly be supposed to yield to the testimony that may be offered,
which may leave the mind open to a fair consideration of that testimony,
constitute no sufficient objection to a juror; but that those strong and deep
impressions which will close the mind against the testimony that may be
offered in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony, and resist
its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him.177
The Court has since made clear that the reason for this permissiveness is not
to limit encroachments on the representative component mandated at the
pre-venire stage. Rather, it is borne out of a need for administrative efficien-
cy.178 The costs attendant to empaneling a jury that is purely neutral are
simply too high.
Trial judges enjoy much discretion in conducting voir dire and identify-
ing and striking unqualified jurors. Yet there are “special circumstances” in
which the Constitution mandates that judges ask jurors specific questions
regarding their biases.179 The Supreme Court has described its decisions in
this area as follows: “[T]he possibility of racial prejudice against a black de-
172. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981); see also Morgan v. Illinois,
504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (“[P]art of the guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is
an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors.”).
173 . See Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 423.
174. Sharon R. Gromer, Sixth Amendment—The Demise of the Doctrine of Implied Juror
Bias, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1507, 1516–17 (1983).
175. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909).
176 . SeeHowe, supra note 4, at 1184 (arguing that the court will only “require[] exclusion
if it appears likely to influence a potential juror’s decision to a powerful degree”).
177. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50–51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
178 . See, e .g ., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (acknowledging the effects of mass
media and noting that “[t]o hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the
guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a pro-
spective juror’s impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard”).
179 . See, e .g ., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 n.12, 37–38 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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fendant charged with a violent crime against a white person is sufficiently
real that the [Constitution] requires that inquiry be made into racial preju-
dice . . . .”180 But this description is incomplete. A review of the cases reveals
that the Court has equivocated on when a more searching voir dire is neces-
sary and has only required specific questioning into racial prejudice when
the criminal case involves both racially disparate parties as well as the poten-
tial for capital punishment.181 Outside this narrow circumstance, specific
questioning of prospective jurors on their various biases concerning the par-
ties or the facts of the case is not constitutionally required.182
There are instances, however, in which the judge is constitutionally re-
quired to question prospective jurors on their ability to enforce the applica-
ble law. Similar to the above exception for context biases, this exception ap-
plies only in criminal cases carrying the potential for capital punishment. In
Witherspoon v . Illinois, decided in 1968, the Supreme Court struck down a
death sentence imposed by a jury entirely comprising citizens who expressed
no “qualms” about capital punishment.183 The Court reasoned that the “jury
fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner was entitled”
and cited a decision related to the fair-cross-section requirement that applies
pre-venire.184 After sweeping away all potential jurors who expressed scru-
ples about capital punishment, the resulting jury could not “express the con-
science of the community” and therefore denied the defendant his constitu-
tional right to an impartial jury.185 Witherspoon and its immediate progeny
are the only cases in which the Supreme Court has hinted that the represent-
ativeness component of the jury extends past venire formation and is impli-
cated in petit jury selection.
This realist approach was abandoned not twenty years later, following a
dramatic rereading of Witherspoon. In Wainwright v . Witt the Court con-
firmed that petit jury selection is chiefly concerned with empaneling a jury
that will consider the facts and apply the law as articulated at trial. “[T]he
180. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424 (1991).
181 . Compare Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190 (1981) (“There is no per
se constitutional rule in such circumstances requiring inquiry as to racial prejudice.” (citing
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976))), with Turner, 476 U.S. at 36–37 (“[A] capital
defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the
race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.”), and Aldridge v. United States
283 U.S. 308, 314 (1931) (noting that the “risk [of racial bias] becomes most grave when the
issue is of life or death”).
182 . See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527–28 (1973) (conceding that bias against
bearded people was possible, but that the Court was unable “to constitutionally distinguish
possible prejudice against beards from a host of other possible similar prejudices”).
183. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
184 . Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 518 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84–86
(1942)).
185 . Id . at 519; see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416 (1985) (“In Witherspoon,
this Court held that the State infringes a capital defendant’s right under the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments to trial by an impartial jury when it excuses for cause all those members of
the venire who express conscientious objections to capital punishment.”).
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proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded
for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment,” the Court ex-
plained, “is whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties in accordance with his instructions and his
oath.’ ”186 No longer was the need for the community’s heterogeneous per-
spectives on capital punishment to be reflected in the petit jury. Instead, the
Court “recognized the State’s legitimate interest in excluding those jurors
whose opposition to capital punishment would not allow them to view the
proceedings impartially, and who therefore might frustrate the administra-
tion of a State’s death penalty scheme.”187 Thus, while jurors must still be
questioned on their willingness to apply the death penalty, their responses
are evaluated on the same standard as exclusions for any other cause.188
Moving on from those instances in which jurors are dismissed due to
some articulable rationale, impartial juries are also constructed through liti-
gants dismissing jurors indiscriminately via peremptory challenges.189 Per-
emptory challenges allow the parties to strike jurors for nearly any reason
whatsoever, and litigants need not provide any rationale for their decisions.
“[B]y enabling each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most par-
tial toward the other side,” the Court has explained, peremptory challenges
“eliminat[e] extremes of partiality on both sides, . . . thereby ‘assuring the se-
lection of a qualified and unbiased jury.’ ”190 The Court has readily acknowl-
edged that this process cuts against the fair-cross-section requirement of the
pre-venire stage. As Justice Scalia noted in reference to peremptory challeng-
es, “[t]he ‘representativeness’ constitutionally required at the venire stage
can be disrupted at the jury-panel stage.”191 All that is required post-venire is
that “in the process of selecting the petit jury the prosecution and defense
will compete on an equal basis.”192 That each side may act with equal irra-
tionality does not disturb the constitutionality of peremptory challenges. In
this area, the interests of the institution are inferior to the impulses of the lit-
igants.
186 . Witt, 469 U.S. at 423 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
187 . See id . at 416.
188 . Id . at 439–40 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Witt decisions “abandons
Witherspoon’s strict limits on death-qualification and holds instead that death-qualification
exclusions be evaluated under the same standards as exclusions for any other cause.”).
189 . See, e .g ., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel . T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (“The principal value of the peremptory is that it helps produce fair and impartial ju-
ries.”); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (peremptory challenges are “one means of
assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury”).
190. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Batson,
476 U.S. at 91).
191 . Id . at 483.
192 . Id . at 481; see also id . at 480 (“The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross sec-
tion on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does
not demand), but an impartial one (which it does).”).
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Note that there are some very narrow restrictions on litigants’ near-
plenary power to strike potential jurors. Litigants may not employ their
strikes on the basis of racist193 or sexist194 stereotypes, for instance.195 But
these restrictions are emphatically derived from the Fourteenth Amendment
under the notion that jury selection constitutes a type of state action.196 The
purpose of these prohibitions is to halt state discrimination; it is not to en-
sure the empaneling of an impartial jury. That is, the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments are silent on how litigants may exercise their peremptory chal-
lenges in the empaneling of a petit jury. Litigants may therefore skew the
representativeness of the empaneled jury with near-impunity.197 And be-
cause a rational litigant will seek jurors favorable to her side and strike jurors
opposed to her side, it is unclear, despite the Supreme Court’s claims to the
contrary, that peremptory challenges actually result in a less biased jury.198 In
fact, the opposite may very well be true: litigants may covertly traffic in ste-
reotypes to silent voices they wish to exclude.199 Allowing litigants to irra-
tionally strike jurors on nothing more than a whim—or a flimsy justifica-
tion200—sits on shaky constitutional footing.201 It is unlikely that this post-
venire procedure would persist if not for historical inertia.202
193 . See Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
194 . See J .E .B ., 511 U.S. at 140.
195. The Ninth Circuit has added to this list discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484–86 (9th Cir. 2014).
196 . J .E .B ., 511 U.S. at 150 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
197 . Holland, 493 U.S. at 480–81 (“[t]he Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross
section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution
does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does),” such “that in the process of selecting
the petit jury the prosecution and defense will compete on an equal basis.”).
198 . See Alschuler, supra note 132, at 210 (outlining the racist motivations of many pros-
ecutors in exercising peremptory challenges).
199 . See, e .g ., Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power,” 27
STAN. L. REV. 545, 553–54 (1975) (arguing that peremptory challenges “avoid[] trafficking in
the core of truth in most common stereotypes” and “allow[] the covert expression of what we
dare not say but know is true more often tha[n] not”).
200. As Justice Thurgood Marshall warned in his Batson v . Kentucky concurrence, “The
decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-
selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges
entirely.” 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986). Indeed, policing this line between permissible and im-
permissible strikes has proven extraordinarily difficult. Foster v . Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737
(2016), a recent Supreme Court case, evidences this point. There, the state used its peremptory
challenges to strike all four black prospective jurors qualified to serve. Id . at 1742. In their
notes, the prosecutors highlighted the black jurors’ names; circled the answer “black” on the
questionnaire; labeled three black jurors “B#1,” “B#2,” and “B#3”; and identified which person
to keep “if we had to pick a black juror.” Id . at 1744. While the Supreme Court’s decision was
heavily concerned with the habeas issue, that numerous lower court judges considered this
overwhelming evidence to not constitute a Batson violation evidences the depth of the prob-
lem. See, e .g ., Grant v. Royal, 886 F.3d 874, 950–52 (10th Cir. 2018).
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Finally, after the jury has been culled from the venire, there are a num-
ber of aspects of the trial process that serve to secure an impartial jury. These
safeguards were first collected in Tanner v . United States, in which the Su-
preme Court refused to accept juror testimony that showed that some jurors
had engaged in alcohol and drug consumption throughout the trial.203 The
Tanner safeguards include: voir dire, which allow litigants to question the
potential jurors in advance; observation of the jury during court, to see if
they were intoxicated; reports by jurors of inappropriate behavior before they
render a verdict, so that the judge may correct the behavior; and post-verdict
impeachment by evidence other than juror testimony, the standard excep-
tion to the no-impeachment rule.204 While Tanner technically concerned ju-
ror competency, the Court extended the reasoning to juror impartiality in
Warger v . Shauers.205 Citing the safeguards, the Court concluded: “[A] par-
ty’s right to an impartial jury remains protected despite Rule 606(b)’s re-
moval of one means of ensuring that jurors are unbiased.”206 Thus, even
when faced with clear evidence that the procedures have failed, the right to
an impartial jury is limited by the jury no-impeachment rule.
This last point makes it abundantly clear that the impartial jury mandate
has historically been realized as a collection of prophylactic procedures ra-
ther than the right to have jury verdicts decided impartially. Without being
able to review deliberations, Courts have developed and refined selection
procedures that attempt to produce a body that a priori will reflect and bal-
ance the institution’s competing responsibilities. These procedures are im-
perfect in predicting whether the empaneled jurors will actually decide a case
impartially. And there is good reason to believe that impermissible biases—
both harmless and invidious—regularly enhance and infect jury delibera-
tions. The next Part speaks to those instances in which the Court has peeked
into the jury room and recognized a substantive right to an impartial jury
that goes beyond those prophylactic procedures outlined above.
III. IMPARTIALITY AS EX POST SUBSTANCE
While the impartial jury mandate has taken form as a series of prophy-
lactic procedures, a substantive component to the right has long lingered in
American jurisprudence. These cases suggested that the Constitution might
require more than just a jury selected according to certain procedures, but
201. Alschuler, supra note 132, at 170 (“The Equal Protection Clause forbids the arbitrary
classification of human beings, and peremptory challenges are inherently arbitrary. Even when
exercised on grounds other than race, these challenges are unconstitutional.”).
202 . See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 639 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (describing peremptory challenges as “a practice of ancient origin” and “part of our
common law heritage”).
203. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
204 . Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127.
205. 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014).
206 . Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529.
February 2019] The New Impartial Jury Mandate 741
also a jury that in fact delivers a verdict impartially. Indeed, in one early case
upholding the no-impeachment rule, the Supreme Court added a tantalizing
qualifier: “[C]ases might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse [ju-
ror testimony] without violating the plainest principles of justice.”207 That
was back in 1852, and while the Court teased the exception again in 1915,208
no examples were provided. However, following adoption of Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b), some lower courts began to recognize exceptions to the ju-
ry no-impeachment rule in order to rectify a specific type of injustice—jury
decisions based on racial prejudices. The Supreme Court foreclosed these
exceptions in 2014 but echoed again that old qualifier: “There may be cases
of juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has
been abridged.”209
The Court found such an instance three years later in Peña-Rodriguez v .
Colorado.210 There, the Court announced that the Sixth Amendment man-
dates an exception to the jury no-impeachment rule “when a juror’s state-
ments indicate that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in his
or her finding of guilt” and that such statements could amount to a “denial
of the jury trial guarantee.”211 This holding significantly alters the Court’s
approach to the impartial jury mandate. By setting aside the no-
impeachment rule, it recognizes for the first time an enforceable substantive
right to have the jurors’ internal mental processes be based only on certain
permissible considerations. As such, the reasoning of jury verdicts—at least
in the narrow case of racial bias—is now subject to judicial scrutiny.
A. Rejected Exceptions to Rule 606(b)
The right articulated in Peña-Rodriguez is best understood in light of
those approaches rejected by the Supreme Court leading up to the decision.
Starting in the 1980s, a number of scholars and judges began to recognize
exceptions to the no-impeachment rule when juror evidence tended to show
that racial animus influenced deliberations. Two approaches emerged: (1)
finding racial animus to fall within the “extraneous evidence” exception to
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b); and (2) recognizing an exception to Rule
606(b) for evidence tending to show that the juror lied during voir dire.212 In
2014, the Supreme Court rejected both circumscriptions but, in so doing,
expanded the Court’s power to recognize an enforceable substantive impar-
tial jury right.
207. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 366 (1851).
208 . See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268–69 (1915) (suggesting the possibility of
exception in the “gravest and most important cases”).
209 . Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 n.3.
210. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
211 . Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867, 869.
212 . See, e .g ., Amanda R. Wolin, Comment, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the
Jury Room  .  .  . But Should It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Ev-
idence 606(b), 60 UCLA L. REV. 262 (2012) (documenting the various approaches).
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The first approach taken by courts trying to probe racial bias during de-
liberation was to read broadly Rule 606(b)’s extraneous influence exception.
That exception states, “A juror may testify about whether . . . extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention.”213
Scholars were the first to recognize that this language might be stretched to
reach racial animus,214 and soon thereafter a handful of district court judges
agreed.215 The logic was that by drawing conclusions on the basis of the de-
fendant’s race, “the juror was . . . trying to persuade his fellow jurors by
bringing ‘facts’ outside the record to their attention.”216 In a 2001 case, Unit-
ed States v . Henley, the Ninth Circuit passed positively on this perspective:
“[T]he broad language of Rule 606(b) could plausibly be read to exclude all
juror testimony regarding racial bias during deliberations—at least to the ex-
tent that such testimony might reveal the influence of racial bias on a juror’s
verdict”; but the Ninth Circuit admitted that most courts had not taken this
approach.217 The court then added, “Racial prejudice is plainly a mental bias
that is unrelated to any specific issue that a juror in a criminal case may legit-
imately be called upon to determine.”218 Under this approach, the juror’s
consideration of race amounted to a breakdown in the trial protections that
control which evidence jurors may consider. It was akin to an inflammatory
newspaper or chatty bailiff in the deliberation room.
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit did not decide Henley on the “extraneous
information” exception, choosing instead to recognize a second implicit ex-
ception to Rule 606(b).219 Under this new approach, the testimony of racist
statements made during deliberations was admissible because it showed that
the juror lied during voir dire when he answered affirmatively that he could
decide the case impartially.220 The First and Fifth Circuits also recognized
213. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2).
214 . See, e .g ., Christopher B. Mueller, Jurors’ Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments in
Federal Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 NEB. L. REV. 920, 942 (1978) (“[I]t is . . . at least arguable
that [considerations based on racial animus] amount to ‘outside influence’ as to which im-
peaching evidence should be allowed.”).
215 . See, e .g ., After Hour Welding, Inc. v. Laneil Mgmt. Co., 324 N.W.2d 686, 689–90
(Wis. 1982) (juror competent to testify as to anti-Semitic statements made by other jurors con-
cerning defendant’s witness since they were “extraneous prejudicial information”); see also To-
bias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1290–91 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[T]he statements in the juror’s
affidavit are sufficient to raise a question as to whether the jury’s verdict was discolored by im-
proper influences . . . .”).
216. State v. Shillcutt, 350 N.W.2d 686, 707 (Wis. 1984) (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
217. 238 F.3d 1111, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001).
218 . Henley, 238 F.3d at 1120; see also id . (“[A] juror may testify concerning any mental
bias in matters unrelated to the specific issues that the juror was called upon to decide . . . .”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 121 n. 5 (1983))); United States v.
Hernandez, 865 F.2d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the “Constitution prohibits a
prosecutor from making race-conscious arguments since it draws the jury’s attention to a
characteristic that the Constitution generally demands that the jury ignore”).
219 . Henley, 238 F.3d at 1121.
220 . Id .
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this dishonesty exception.221 The foundation for this exception came from
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc . v . Greenwood, a case in which the Su-
preme Court decided that jury verdicts could be impeached by nonjuror evi-
dence showing that the juror lied during post-venire voir dire questioning.222
The Supreme Court there ruled that if appellants can show “that a juror
failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further
show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a chal-
lenge for cause,” then they are entitled to a new trial.223 By recognizing an
implied exception to the no-impeachment rule in instances in which evi-
dence from deliberations showed that the jurors had lied about their harbor-
ing of racial prejudices, the Ninth Circuit and other courts could rectify a
breakdown in the traditional procedures. Under this approach, it is not the
racism that is problematic; it is the initial lie.
In 2014, the Supreme Court in Warger v . Shauers rejected both the ex-
traneous influence and dishonesty exceptions to Rule 606.224 That was a civil
case involving a dispute over a motorcycle accident in which Warger sus-
tained serious injuries and sued a young woman for negligence.225 During
voir dire, the jurors each confirmed that there was no reason why they
thought they could not be “a fair and impartial juror on this kind of case.”226
But after the verdict was returned in favor of Shauers, one of the jurors in-
formed Warger’s attorney that another juror had spoken during delibera-
tions about “a motor vehicle collision in which her daughter was at fault for
the collision and a man died,” and had further “related that if her daughter
had been sued, it would have ruined her life.”227 Warger moved for a new tri-
al, claiming that the juror had materially lied during voir dire when ques-
tioned about her ability to act as a fair and impartial juror.228 The district
court denied that motion and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, adding that the
juror’s testimony also did not fall within Rule 606(b)’s “extraneous infor-
mation” exception.229 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unani-
mously affirmed.
In addressing Warger’s claims, the Supreme Court first rejected his ar-
gument that there exists an implicit exception to Rule 606(b) for statements
showing that a juror lied during voir dire.230 The Court noted that such a
challenge amounts to an “inquiry into the validity of a verdict” and thus falls
221 . See Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 166–67 (1st Cir. 2013); Martinez v.
Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369, 372 (Former 5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981).
222. 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984).
223 . McDonough Power Equip ., 464 U.S. at 556.
224. 135 S. Ct. 521, 524 (2014).
225 . Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 524.
226 . Id .
227 . Id .
228 . Id .
229 . Id . at 525.
230 . Id . (quoting FED. R. EVID. 606(b)).
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squarely into the plain terms of Rule 606(b)’s general prohibition.231 Moreo-
ver, an exception could not be implied merely because one of the procedures
tending to secure an impartial jury failed, as the broad ruling in Tanner v .
United States foreclosed such an approach.232 The Court thus concluded that
“[e]ven if jurors lie in voir dire in a way that conceals bias, juror impartiality
is adequately assured by the parties’ ability to bring to the court’s attention
any evidence of bias before the verdict is rendered, and to employ nonjuror
evidence even after the verdict is rendered.”233
The Court then addressed Warger’s claim that the juror’s statements
amounted to “extraneous prejudicial information . . . improperly brought to
the jury’s attention.”234 But “[i]nformation is deemed ‘extraneous,’ ” the
Court explained in rejecting the argument, “if it derives from a source ‘ex-
ternal’ to the jury.”235 The juror’s “daughter’s accident may well have in-
formed her general views about negligence liability for car crashes, but it did
not provide either her or the rest of the jury with any specific knowledge re-
garding Shauers’ collision with Warger.”236 Her general biases could not
sneak through Rule 606(b)’s statutory exception to prove that the jury was
infected with unchaperoned evidence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled
the testimony inadmissible.
The most important part of the Warger decision is not how it foreclosed
those approaches taken by lower courts in the preceding decades; rather, it is
a single footnote—Footnote Three. In highlighting that the Tanner protec-
tions persisted despite a failure of the procedures tending to secure an im-
partial jury, the Court recognized in Footnote Three a potential exception to
the jury no-impeachment rule, stating, “There may be cases of juror bias so
extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has been abridged.”237
But unlike the Court’s expressions of this principle in 1851238 and 1915,239
the Court did not stop there. Instead, it went further to articulate how such
an injustice could be identified: “If and when such a case arises, the Court
can consider whether the usual safeguards are or are not sufficient to protect
the integrity of the process.”240 In so stating, the Court planted a seed for
recognizing a general exception to the jury no-impeachment rule and an en-
231 . Id .; see also Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2003) (“McDonough ad-
dressed the right of a party to obtain a new trial upon making a particular showing, not the
admissibility of evidence to make that showing.”).
232 . Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529.
233 . Id .
234 . Id . (quoting FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(A)).
235 . Id .
236 . Id .
237 . Id . at 529 n.3.
238. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).
239. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
240 . Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 (citing Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987)).
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forceable right to ex post substantive review of jury decisionmaking ration-
ales.241 That seed would sprout just three years later.
B. Constitutionally Required Review of Deliberations
In 2017, the Supreme Court decided Peña-Rodriguez v . Colorado and
dramatically reshaped the impartial jury mandate.242 Drawing upon Foot-
note Three’s framework, the Court identified for the first time an instance in
which a jury verdict could be impeached—not because of a breakdown in
prophylactic procedure but because of a juror’s internal mental processes. In
so identifying, the Court recognized an enforceable Sixth Amendment right
not just to trial by a jury selected according to procedures that make it likely
to decide a case impartially, but also to trial by one that actually did—that is,
at least with respect to racial animus.243
The facts are straightforward. Mr. Peña-Rodriguez faced criminal charg-
es in Colorado for harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexu-
al assault of two teenage sisters, which allegedly occurred in a bathroom at a
horse racing facility.244 Before the trial, the jurors each confirmed orally and
in writing that they foresaw no reason to believe that anything about them or
the case would make it difficult for them to judge the matter impartially.245
Following a three-day trial, the jury convicted Mr. Peña-Rodriguez of unlaw-
ful sexual contact and harassment but did not reach agreement on the at-
tempted sexual assault charge.246
After the jurors were discharged, two of them lingered to speak with Mr.
Peña-Rodriguez’s lawyer.247 They informed him that during deliberations
one of the other jurors, identified as H.C., had expressed anti-Hispanic bias
against Mr. Peña-Rodriguez and one of his alibi witnesses.248 The two jurors
signed an affidavit swearing that H.C. had: (1) expressed his conviction that
“Mexican men are physically controlling of women because of their sense of
entitlement” and that he believed “[Mr. Peña-Rodriguez] did it because he’s
Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want”; (2) noted that based
on his “experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican men ha[ve] a
241. This approach put the Supreme Court in agreement with the First and Tenth Cir-
cuits, which had already rejected claims of voir dire dishonesty in favor of a Tanner analysis.
Compare United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 88 (1st Cir. 2009) (concluding that the Tanner
protections are often ineffective and that trial judges have discretion under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to inquire into validity of the verdict due to alleged ethnic bias), with United
States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the Tanner protections
sufficiently guarded against racial bias).
242. 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017).
243 . Peña-Rodriguez 137 S. Ct. at 869.
244 . Id . at 861.
245 . Id .
246 . Id .
247 . Id .
248 . Id . at 861–62.
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bravado that cause[s] them to believe they [can] do whatever they want[]
with women” and that “nine times out of ten Mexican men [are] guilty of be-
ing aggressive toward women and young girls”; and (3) erroneously cast
doubt on the credibility of one of the alibi witnesses because he was “an ille-
gal.”249 The affidavit was presented to the trial court judge, who refused the
testimony due to Colorado’s version of the no-impeachment rule.250 Mr. Pe-
ña-Rodriguez appealed through to the Colorado Supreme Court, which af-
firmed.251 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a five–three deci-
sion, reversed and remanded the case.252
The Supreme Court began by reviewing the history of the jury no-
impeachment rule, noting its “substantial merit” in advancing such policies
as full and vigorous deliberation, preventing harassment of jurors, and pro-
moting the finality of verdicts.253 It then traced the lurking history of sub-
stantive impartiality back to Reid in 1851, McDonald in 1915, and ultimately
Warger in 2014, noting that the Court had long recognized that there may be
instances of injustice in which the Constitution would compel the Court’s
attention past the deliberation room door.254 It then reviewed the holdings in
Tanner and Warger, noting that while the traditional procedures failed to
prevent bacchanalia and bias from infecting jury deliberations in those in-
stances, the safeguards were ordinarily “sufficient to protect the integrity of
the process” from such problems.255
The racism in Mr. Peña-Rodriguez’s case was different for two reasons,
the Court declared. First, despite the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of
“eliminat[ing] racial discrimination emanating from official sources,” racism
has persisted.256 Because of this, since the Civil War the Court has at times
recognized the need for added procedures—nondiscrimination in drawing a
venire, restrictions on the use of peremptory challenges, and required certain
questioning during voir dire—to ensure that individuals who sit on juries are
free of racial prejudices.257 The common thread, the Court surmised, is that
249 . Id . The Court made a point of noting that “the witnesses testified during trial that he
was a legal resident of the United States,” presumably to suggest that H.C.’s skepticism was
derived not from witness criminality but from racial profiling. See id .
250 . Id .
251 . Id .
252 . Id . at 862–63, 871.
253 . Id . at 865. Conspicuously absent from the Court’s list is the jury no-impeachment
rule’s ability to ensure juror independence. This was certainly no mere oversight. The Court’s
recognition of a substantive right to a jury that bases its decision only on constitutionally per-
missible rationales cuts to the core of the jury as an independent institution..
254 . Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865–67.
255 . Id .
256 . Id . at 867–68 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)).
257 . See id . Conspicuously absent from this list is the Impartial Jury Mandate’s fair-cross-
section requirement. See id . at 868.
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“discrimination on the basis of race, ‘odious in all aspects, is especially perni-
cious in the administration of justice.’ ”258
Second, racial bias is distinct from Tanner and Warger due to its fre-
quency and tendency to elude detection.259 The unacceptable acts in Tanner
and Warger involved “anomalous behavior,” and “neither history nor com-
mon experience show that the jury system is rife with mischief of these or
similar kinds.”260 Racial bias, on the other hand, the Court explained, is “a
familiar and recurring evil.”261 The traditional prophylactic safeguards may
be compromised or prove insufficient in halting this evil: questioning poten-
tial jurors on racial animus during voir dire runs the risk of exacerbating
prejudices,262 and jurors might find it difficult to report racist statements to
the judge due to the “stigma” of accusing a fellow juror of bigotry.263 Racial
bias thus “implicates unique historical, constitutional and institutional con-
cerns.”264
Following these conclusions, the Court announced the new rule: The
Sixth Amendment requires an exception to the jury no-impeachment rule
when a “juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on ra-
cial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, . . . in order to
permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and
any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.”265 The Court warned that not
every offhand comment necessitates judicial scrutiny; rather:
For the inquiry to proceed there must be a showing that one or more jurors
made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the
fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting verdict. To
qualify, the statement must tend to show that racial animus was a signifi-
cant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.266
The Court explicitly did not articulate a standard for “determining when ev-
idence of racial bias is sufficient to require that a verdict be set aside and a
new trial granted,” leaving that to the considerable discretion of trial judg-
es.267
258 . Id . at 868 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
259 . Id .
260 . Id .
261 . Id .
262 . Id . at 869 (citing Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 195 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in result)).
263 . Id . The Court provided zero support for this proposition. And it is far from clear
that there is a greater stigma in calling a fellow juror a bigot as opposed to a drug user or a liar.
Id .
264 . Id . at 868.
265 . Id . at 869.
266 . Id .
267 . Id . at 870.
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To understand the substantive impartial jury right articulated in Peña-
Rodriguez requires some unpacking of the above passage.268 There are osten-
sibly two separate inquiries required by the holding. First, the trial judge
must determine whether racism played a significant role in a juror’s decision
to convict a criminal defendant. Upon that threshold showing, the trial judge
is secondly required to determine whether there resulted a violation of the
defendant’s “jury trial guarantee.”269 Here is where the trouble starts. The
problem is that it is unclear to which “jury trial guarantee” the Court is refer-
ring. The opinion does not reference any of the traditional jury protections
previously thought required by the Constitution. The only conclusion, then,
is that the second Peña-Rodriguez inquiry collapses into the first. That is, the
“jury trial guarantee” articulated is the right to a verdict in which racial ani-
mus was not a significant motivating factor in a juror’s vote to convict.
Make no mistake, there is nothing in the opinion suggesting that juror
testimony of racism is evidence for some other constitutional shortcoming.
The Court is not saying that H.C.’s anti-Hispanic bias shows ex post that
something went astray in empaneling the jury, and it was to this procedural
right that Mr. Peña-Rodriguez was denied. Warger forecloses that reading.270
As the Court made clear in Footnote Three, it is not merely the failure of the
Tanner protections but rather their inherent insufficiency at rooting out cer-
tain types of extreme bias that might require the Court to recognize an ex-
ception to the no-impeachment rule.271 It is presumably for this reason that
the Peña-Rodriguez Court spends so much time explaining that there is
something unique about racial animus. In Peña-Rodriguez, the Supreme
Court recognizes the insufficiency of the traditional safeguards; it does not
announce a backstop for when those safeguards fail.
Moreover, the Court is not suggesting that the presence of a racist juror
is itself a violation of the Sixth Amendment. That is, the Court is not stating
that H.C.’s anti-Hispanic racism demonstrates that he was unable to decide
the case impartially and that therefore Mr. Peña-Rodriguez was denied an
impartial jury from the start. This reading is foreclosed by the Court in Peña-
Rodriguez leaving open the possibility of a distinction between those instanc-
268. Some early, alternative approaches include: Lauren Crump, Comment, Removing
Race from the Jury Deliberation Room: The Shortcomings of Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado and
How to Address Them, 52 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 475, 482 (2018) (describing the holding as “an
exception to Rule 606(b)”); Carrie Leonetti, Smoking Guns: The Supreme Court’s Willingness to
Lower Procedural Barriers to Merits Review in Cases Involving Egregious Racial Bias in the
Criminal Justice System, 101 MARQUETTE L. REV. 205, 211 (2017) (describing the Court’s will-
ingness to “bend the procedural rules [in order to] open itself to claims of racial bias”).
269 . Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
270. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 530 (2014) (holding that juror testimony cannot
be used to show a violation of the impartial jury mandate); see alsoMcDonough Power Equip.,
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984) (holding that nonjuror testimony can be used to
show a violation of the mandate).
271 . See Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 n.3 (holding that when the Court considers injustices
necessitating exceptions to the no-impeachment rule, it will “consider whether the usual safe-
guards are or are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the process”).
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es in which there was a single racist juror and those in which racism pervad-
ed the jury.272 This potential opening runs counter to the established Sixth
Amendment promise that defendants are “entitled to be tried by [twelve],
not [nine] or even [ten], impartial and unprejudiced jurors.”273 Thus, while it
may be true that H.C. should have been struck for cause and that Mr. Peña-
Rodriguez was provided an insufficient number of impartial jurors, the
Court is not concerned with that. Instead, it is H.C.’s mental processes that
are constitutionally problematic. It is the substantive rationale upon which
the verdict was reached.
Because H.C.’s racism is not being used as evidence for the denial of
some preexisting Constitutional right, the “jury trial guarantee” to which the
Court is referring must be the right to have jury decisions to convict not
based significantly on racial stereotypes and animus. This is a new and dis-
tinct right from those the Court has recognized in the past. For the first time,
the Court has acknowledged an enforceable right to have the substance of
juror deliberations conform to notions of impartiality. No longer does the
Constitution only require that the jurors be drawn from “a fair cross section
of the community”274 and “capable and willing to decide the case solely on
the evidence before it,”275 it now also requires that the jury actually reached
its verdict impartially.
This new component of the impartial jury mandate evidences a trans-
formation in the Court’s thinking of the jury as an institution. It privileges a
formalist conception of the jury’s responsibility to dispense individualized
justice over a realist conception of the jury’s role to provide the voice of the
community. To be sure, that the community has throughout history spoken
in vile tongues has never before justified an intrusion into the jury’s unique
province to provide and deny individualized justice. It has long been thought
that the prophylactic procedures, while certainly flawed, sufficiently bal-
anced the institution’s responsibilities and inherent tension. By stripping
away its veil of secrecy, however, the Court severely reduces the jury’s ability
to act independently and incorporate extralegal considerations into its deci-
sionmaking. And while some will surely celebrate the collapse of the jury’s
political power in the narrow circumstance of racial animus, this newfound
rise in judicial scrutiny of jury deliberations should give us pause. As more
than a few scholars and jurists have warned, such scrutiny has the potential
to turn every jury verdict into a judge’s verdict.276 The jury’s unique demo-
272 . Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869–71 (refusing to articulate an appropriate standard
for recognizing a violation of the “jury trial guarantee” and comparing Shillcutt v . Gagnon, 827
F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987) (inquiring whether racial bias “pervaded the jury room”), with
United States v . Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) (“One racist juror would be
enough.”)).
273. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364, 366 (1966) (per curiam).
274. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
275. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
276 . See, e .g ., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987) (“It is not at all
clear . . . that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.”); see also Victor Gold,
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cratic insights wilt before judges’ supposed expertise. The waiting questions,
which the next Part addresses, are how the holding in Peña-Rodriguez will
grow, whether a principled doctrine can contain it, and whether it will im-
pact the Court’s approach to the traditional prophylactic procedures.
IV. APPLYING THENEW IMPARTIAL JURYMANDATE
The degree to which the Supreme Court is willing to recognize a sub-
stantive impartial jury right is unclear. While the majority in Peña-Rodriguez
is adamant that the decision is limited to racial biases in criminal cases, it is
unlikely that the Court can identify a limiting principle to exclude testimony
of bias against additional suspected classes or from applying the right in oth-
er jury contexts.277 Likewise, the language of Warger’s Footnote Three leaves
room for recognizing extreme biases against nonsuspect classes that no less
evade detection and undermine the administration of justice.278 Without a
constitutionally rooted framework, ad hoc judicial review will substantially
undermine the jury’s role as an independent constitutional actor.279 The
Equal Protection Clause’s tiers of scrutiny offer guidance for containing this
newfound judicial power. Courts should apply more stringent review of bias
against suspect classes, and deferential review to bias against nonsuspect
classes. Properly implemented, such a restriction can allow ex post substan-
tive review to operate alongside ex ante procedures to strengthen the jury’s
ability both to deliver individualized justice and to exercise political power.
A. A Tiered Approach to Scrutinizing Biases
Peña-Rodriguez is unquestionably a Sixth Amendment decision.280 By
deciding the dispute as such, the majority avoided sticky questions such as
whether Colorado jurors should be considered state actors or whether Colo-
Juror Competency to Testify That a Verdict Was the Product of Racial Bias, 9 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 125, 136–37 (1993) (“If jurors could be made to testify as to the thought
processes that formed the foundation of a verdict, then any exercise of their power inconsistent
with the values of the judge could be detected and controlled.”).
277 . Cf . Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868–69 (2017) (noting that “dis-
crimination on the basis of race, ‘odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the admin-
istration of justice’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979))).
278. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 n.3 (2014) (noting that when the Court con-
siders injustices necessitating exceptions to the no-impeachment rule, it can “consider whether
the usual safeguards are or are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the process”).
279 . See, e .g ., Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 581 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that “[w]hile
jurors may reach a verdict because of secret beliefs that have little to do with the law or the
facts,” inquiry into such matters “would destroy the effectiveness of the jury process which
substantial justice demands and the [C]onstitution guarantees” (quoting United States v.
D’Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. 1979))).
280 . Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (“[W]here a juror makes a clear statement that
indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the
Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way.”).
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rado intentionally discriminated by upholding their verdict.281 Nevertheless,
as Justice Alito’s dissent highlights, the holding seems to sound more in con-
cepts drawn from the Fourteenth Amendment than it does in the Sixth
Amendment.282 The majority’s emphasis on the nation’s shameful history of
racial discrimination suggests that the decision is not so much motivated by
the denial of some implicit trial guarantee but rather the juror’s considera-
tion of a rationale deeply contrary to the Constitution. Furthermore, the ma-
jority’s admission that “[a]ll forms of improper bias pose challenges to the
trial process”283 hints at a “hierarchy of partiality.”284 Identifying the contours
of that hierarchy is necessary, lest all jury verdicts be opened to Lochner-
esque judicial review.285
The Equal Protection Clause’s tiers of scrutiny can serve as a framework
to help guide this new area of impartial jury jurisprudence and identify those
juror biases of which the Constitution is more or less tolerant. A cursory re-
view of the tiers of scrutiny exposes its kinship to the substantive impartial
jury guarantee. Although by its plain terms the Equal Protection Clause only
demands that “[n]o [s]tate shall . . . deny any person equal protection of the
laws,”286 a thick judicial gloss has been applied over eighty years to demar-
cate between permissible and impermissible state discrimination. The first
brush of that gloss, not unlike the substantive impartial jury protection,
came in a single footnote. In United States v . Carolene Products Co ., Justice
Stone suggested in Footnote Four that “prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition . . . curtail[ing] the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and [so]
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”287 That is,
the need for heightened judicial review of certain legislative acts arose from a
presumptive failure in the democratic political processes.288 This is not un-
like the procedural breakdown the Supreme Court recognized as motivating
the need for a substantive impartial jury right inWarger: “If and when such a
case arises, the Court can consider whether the usual safeguards are or are
not sufficient to protect the integrity of the process.”289 Where democratic
281. For a review of the Fourteenth Amendment and the state action doctrine, see gener-
ally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 886–88 (1987)
282 . Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 882–84 (Alito, J., dissenting). Note that judges have
voiced this critique of the impartial jury mandate in other contexts. E .g ., Duren v. Missouri,
439 U.S. 357, 371–72 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (critiquing the fair-cross-section re-
quirement).
283 . Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
284 . Id . at 883 (Alito, J., dissenting).
285 . See generally Sunstein, supra note 281 (reviewing the history of controversy of Loch-
ner v . New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
286. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
287. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
288. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714 (1985).
289. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 n.3 (2014).
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processes routinely fail to ensure equality to certain classes of individuals,
the Court is wont to step in.
Over time, the Court refined its approach to the Equal Protection Clause
according to the classifications upon which the law divided.290 Regulations
discriminating on suspect classification—which include race, religion, na-
tional origin, and gender—must satisfy heightened scrutiny.291 Under the
typical test, the Court presumes that a law is unconstitutional unless it is nar-
rowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.292 Discrimination on the
basis of a nonsuspect classification—that is, any basis other than those falling
into the suspect classes—need only satisfy deferential scrutiny.293 Under this
typical test, a law is presumed constitutional so long as it is rationally related
to some legitimate state interest.294 Adopting this tiered approach allows
courts to guard against discrimination of groups traditionally locked out of
the political process, while also restraining judges from second guessing the
wisdom of every government act.295
The Fourteenth Amendment’s division between suspect and nonsuspect
classes can guide courts in extrapolating the substantive component of the
impartial jury mandate. Already there is little doubt that Peña-Rodriguez will
be extended to other suspect classifications. There is no hierarchy among the
suspect classes; discrimination against any one is equally repugnant to the
Constitution and the administration of justice. Further, note that the Court
in Peña-Rodriguez makes little effort to discern whether the discrimination
at issue is on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.296 It is therefore
no reach to suggest that all three fall within the holding. Likewise, it does not
take much imagination to make out the hypothetical in which discrimina-
tion on the basis of religion or gender eludes—in the terms of Warger’s
Footnote Three—“the usual safeguards” and undermines the “integrity of
the process.”297 There is no reason to think that potential jurors are somehow
less likely to voice racial bigotry during voir dire than they are to voice sexist
290 . See generally James E. Fleming, “There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An
Appreciation of Justice Stevens’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301
(2006) (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause has grown).
291. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
297, 303 (1997).
292 . See id . at 300; cf . United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567–68 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the rigid use of the tiers and accusing the court of employing height-
ened scrutiny to address gender discrimination).
293. Bhagwat, supra note 291, at 303.
294 . Id .
295 . See Sunstein, supra note 281.
296 . See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.Ct. 855, 863 (2017) (noting that the Court is
referring to the discrimination as on the basis of race in keeping with the primary terminology
employed by the parties).
297 . See Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 n.3 (2014); see also After Hour Welding,
Inc. v. Laneil Mgmt. Co., 324 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Wis. 1982) (involving a juror’s anti-Semitic
statements during deliberations).
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and religious bigotry, as these positions are all socially loathsome.298 So while
racism surely “implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional
concerns,”299 it is unclear that these concerns are constitutionally distinct
from bigotry toward other suspect classes.300
It is also unlikely that the Court can find a principled basis to limit Peña-
Rodriguez to criminal cases. Although the Court has at times recognized
constitutionally required jury procedures that only apply in the criminal
context, these are limited to the unique circumstance of interracial violence
and the potential for capital punishment.301 Alternatively, courts and schol-
ars generally agree that the impartiality required by the Sixth Amendment
extends with equal force to the Constitution’s other jury trial guarantees.302
Moreover, perhaps the strongest reason to suspect that the holding will be
extended is the fact that Warger v . Shauers—the principle case that first ar-
ticulated the test for identifying circumstances in which reviewing jury de-
liberations for substantive impartiality is required—was itself a civil case.303
It seems implausible that the Court could rely on that critical precedent
while limiting its holding to the criminal context.
But while expanding Peña-Rodriguez as such may seem predetermined,
there is still the question of whether the substantive impartial jury right ap-
plies to nonsuspect classes. As Justice Alito correctly notes in his Peña-
Rodriguez dissent, “Nothing in . . . the inherent nature of the jury trial right
suggests that the extent of the protection provided . . . depends on the nature
of the jury’s partiality or bias.”304 To be sure, there is something repugnant
about denying a person individualized justice before an impartial jury mere-
ly because the bias exerted against her does not implicate great historic or
political concern. Justice Alito offers an extended hypothetical exposing the
difficulty of dividing between biases within an institution responsible for de-
livering individualized justice:
At the trial of the first prisoner, a juror, during deliberations, expressed an-
imosity toward the defendant because of his race. At the trial of the second
prisoner, a juror, during deliberations, expressed animosity toward the de-
fendant because was wearing the jersey of a hated football team. In both
cases, jurors come forward after the trial and reveal what the biased juror
298 . See Babcock, supra note 199, at 554 (“Some jurors will intentionally deceive the
court, perhaps because they are ashamed to admit attitudes that are socially unfashionable or
even because they might welcome the chance to seek retaliation against a litigant.”).
299 . Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
300 . Cf . After Hour Welding, 324 N.W.2d at 690 (“Whenever it comes to a trial court’s
attention that a jury verdict may have been the result of any form of prejudice based on race,
religion, gender or national origin, judges should be especially sensitive to such allegations and
conduct an investigation to ‘ferret out the truth.’ ” (quoting Morgan v. United States, 399 F.2d
93, 97 (5th Cir. 1968))).
301 . See supra notes 174–181 and accompanying text.
302 . See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
303 . SeeWarger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 524, 529 n.3 (2014).
304 . Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 882 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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said in the jury room. The Court would say to the first prisoner: “You are
entitled to introduce the jurors’ testimony, because racial bias is damaging
to our society.” To the second, the Court would say: “Even if you did not
have an impartial jury, you must stay in prison because sports rivalries are
not a major societal issue.”305
As this example demonstrates, although “the constitutional interests of
the affected party are at their strongest when a jury employs [suspect] bias in
reaching its verdict,” this does not mean that the interests of other affected
parties in receiving individualized justice are nonexistent.306 There must be a
way to recognize the impartial jury rights of nonsuspect classes without di-
recting judicial scrutiny at the jury’s every consideration.
This is the point at which the Equal Protection Clause analogy starts to
break down. Unlike the legislature, which might discriminate against a non-
suspect class to advance a legitimate state interest, a jury cannot be said to be
advancing a goal separate from its decision to act upon its discriminatory ra-
tionale.307 That is, there is no “legitimate” or “compelling” interest in provid-
ing or denying a criminal defendant or civil litigant individualized justice on
the basis of any bias. Thus, it is impossible to completely transport a doctrine
chiseled for the purpose of governing broadly applicable legislation into the
narrow context of individualized justice. The tiers-of-scrutiny analogy must
therefore be modified for it to have any credence in the jury trial right con-
text.
The Court must look beyond the legitimacy of the jury’s motivating ra-
tionales in discriminating against the litigants, of which there are likely none,
and instead toward the degree to which the discrimination influenced the
jury’s deliberations and verdict. The Court has already implicitly adopted
this approach to scrutinizing the degree to which the bias influenced a ju-
ror’s decision. Note that the test articulated in Peña-Rodriguez requires that
the racial bias must have served as a “significant motivating factor in the ju-
ror’s vote to convict” before a Constitutional violation is recognized.308 In so
deciding, the Court concludes that some racism is fine, just not too much. If
this approach is constitutionally acceptable for suspect classes, an even more
deferential approach should be required for nonsuspect classes. The Court
might require that bias on the basis of a nonsuspect classification be, per-
haps, a dispositive factor for a constitutional violation to be recognized. Sig-
nificant bias voiced in deliberation against a member of a nonprotected
class—a police officer, for example309—would be acceptable so long as the
305 . Id . at 883.
306. 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6074, at 513 (2d ed. 2007).
307 . See generally Bhagwat, supra note 291, at 299–303 (discussing the role of purpose
scrutiny in judicial review).
308 . Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (emphasis added).
309. It is critical that the jury maintain its power to act as a bulwark against abuses by the
state and state actors.
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jurors even slightly reviewed the contours of the case. This type of play in the
joints would help ensure that the Court does not shirk its duty to guarantee
an impartial jury to all litigants, while also preventing judges from scrutiniz-
ing jurors’ every consideration.310
This tiered approach, or one like it, has other benefits as well. It con-
cedes that discrimination against suspect classes implicates political and so-
cial concerns more broadly than do other forms of discrimination. As a lead-
ing treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure notes, when biases against
suspect classes infect deliberations it “undermines the jury’s ability to per-
form its function as a buffer against governmental oppression and, in fact,
converts the jury itself into an instrument of oppression.”311 Indeed, there is
an argument to be made that those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
understood it as a restriction on the jury’s power to deny justice to discrete
and insular minorities.312 Nonsuspect classes occupy a different socio-
political space than suspect classes. Thus, as the Court has concluded in the
Fourteenth Amendment context, nonsuspect classes require less—although
not zero—judicial intervention for protection from the state. The jury as a
state-like actor is similar in this respect and thus implicates similar concerns.
The community’s democratic input must remain undisturbed except in the
most glaring instances of discrimination. The different approaches for pars-
ing bias against suspect and nonsuspect classes proposed here do not reflect
the degree of the harm, which as Justice Alito’s dissent cogently contends, is
similar,313 but rather recognizes that different tools are necessary to ensure
equality within our institutions.
Perhaps most importantly, this tiered approach preserves the jury’s abil-
ity to consider factors that the law and Constitution prohibit judges from
considering. Juror partialities, whether under the auspices of common sense
or the shadow of bigotry, supply the jury’s unique institutional power. While
we dare not say it too loudly, the jury traffics in stereotypes and prejudices,
some more acceptable and some more loathsome than others. Although the
Constitution cannot tolerate the racial bias in Peña-Rodriguez, there must be
flexibility for the decisionmaking shortcuts that jurors regularly rely on in
reaching their decisions. As the Fifth Circuit noted in 1970, “We cannot ex-
310. This approach does not relieve courts of the difficult task of deciding when bias
served as a significant, or even dispositive, motivating factor. Reasonable minds can likely not
disagree that the racism in Peña-Rodriguez is problematic—Justice Kagan described the re-
marks as “the best smoking-gun evidence you’re ever going to see about race bias in the jury
room.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855 (No. 15-606). There
will, of course, be closer calls that will confound. But note that the proposed approach is no
fuzzier than the tiers of scrutiny as applied to the legislature.
311. 27 WRIGHT&GOLD, supra note 306, § 6074, at 513.
312 . E .g ., Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1201 (2011) (“[One] plausible reading is that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment disallowed the right [for juries] to nullify only in cases in which victims are discrete and
insular minorities.”).
313 . See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
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punge from jury deliberations the subjective opinions of jurors, their attitu-
dinal expositions, or their philosophies. These involve the very human ele-
ments that constitute one of the strengths of our jury system, and we cannot
and should not excommunicate them from jury deliberations.”314
B. Ex Ante Procedures Versus Ex Post Substantive Review
The Supreme Court’s willingness to discard the no-impeachment rule in
instances of extreme bias does not abruptly outmode the traditional ex ante
procedures. While these procedures emerged out of a need to ensure impar-
tiality in a world in which jury deliberations could not be reviewed,315 the
procedures nevertheless continue to serve a critical role in satisfying the
Constitution’s impartial jury mandate. However, there are certain prophy-
lactic procedures, specifically peremptory challenges, that are more difficult
now than ever to justify as a means of ensuring an impartial jury.
First, those ex ante procedures that apply pre–venire formation are
completely unaffected by the Court’s pronouncement of ex post substantive
review. The two protections go toward securing completely separate concep-
tions of jury impartiality. Pre-venire procedures are concerned with securing
a realist vision for the jury that reflects the heterogeneous perspectives of so-
ciety, whereas ex post substantive review is concerned with rectifying those
instances in which the community’s views run counter to the Constitution.
Theoretically, at least, they complement one another in ensuring that the ju-
ry is capable of bringing its democratic legitimacy fairly to bear on a given
dispute. More practically, however, it would be unrealistic to expect judges
to review juror testimony for evidence tending to show that the discussion
lacked the “qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience.”316
For some of the same reasons that the Court does not require petit juries to
be replications of society, it would be absurd for a judge to review jury delib-
erations in a vain attempt to ensure balanced biases were voiced.317 As such,
pre-venire procedures remain critical in securing an impartial jury.
Alternatively, the post-venire procedures are more open to criticism.
The process of winnowing the carefully constructed and representative veni-
re is historically justified on the basis of ensuring that the selected jurors are
free from those biases that might affect their ability to decide the dispute im-
partially.318 Courts accept that this practice cuts against the Constitution’s
guarantee of a democratically representative body because it is necessary to
314. United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1022–23 (5th Cir. 1970), rev’d on other
grounds on reh’g, 434 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1970).
315 . See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text.
316. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J.).
317 . See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986) (noting that this approach would
require judges “to undertake the Sisyphean task of ‘balancing’ juries, making sure that each
contains the proper number of Democrats and Republicans, young persons and old persons,
white-collar executives and blue-collar laborers”).
318 . See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text.
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ensure that the parties are provided jurors that are likely to consider their
dispute chiefly on the basis of the evidence provided.319 But we might ques-
tion whether this process of excluding citizens from meaningful political
participation is justified after Peña-Rodriguez. That is to suggest, if the Court
is willing to review the substance of jury deliberations to ensure that they are
free of constitutionally impermissible rationales, it is less necessary for the
Court to dictate the empaneling of the jury in the first instance, particularly
when these practices stand so firmly against representativeness as an animat-
ing principle.
These criticisms, however, fail to understand the full benefits of ex ante
procedure and the considerable limitations of ex post substantive review.
The voir dire process of identifying and striking those potential jurors with
actual and implied biases continues to advance a number of interests even
post-Peña-Rodriguez. First, there are marked administrative considerations.
As Professor Howe has explained, “[S]tates have a significant interest in ex-
cluding biased jurors efficiently,” which counsels “against a system involving
purely random selection of impartial jurors.”320 It would be exceedingly
wasteful to require states to wait until after the trial and verdict to realize that
someone with a familiar relationship to the litigants or a personal interest in
the outcome of the case somehow wound up on the jury.321 Likewise, there
are still circumstances in which the Court must be free to strike jurors be-
cause of implied biases. While in theory the Court could seat the juror who
swears to be able to decide the case impartially and whistle until contrary ev-
idence emerges, there is limited benefit and great expense associated with
such dilatoriness.
Further, it is unclear whether ex post substantive review is even an effec-
tive tool for rooting out most forms of problematic biases. The test articulat-
ed in Peña-Rodriguez considers only “statements exhibiting overt . . . bias.”322
As such, it does nothing to address unspoken, implicit, or unconscious
forms of juror partiality.323 This is despite the fact that overwhelming empir-
ical evidence suggests that most prejudices are automatic and invisible, even
to those who harbor them.324 Accordingly, an objective standard of implied
bias continues to be necessary earlier in the proceedings. It should certainly
not be a stretch for a judge to conclude, for instance, that a Ku Klux Klan
member is lying either to himself or to the court when he swears that he can
put aside his prejudices and judge a case involving a black or Jewish litigant
319 . See supra notes 168–178 and accompanying text.
320. Howe, supra note 4, at 1193, 1196.
321 . See supra notes 176–178 and accompanying text.
322. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
323 . See Crump, supra note 268, at 484 (reviewing the shortcomings of Peña-Rodriguez).
324 . See, e .g ., Rudman et al., supra note 102, at 856.
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impartially.325 Note that this is true even if the judge had access to a complete
transcript of the jury’s deliberations and could confirm that no overt bias
was apparent in its decisionmaking. The potentially surreptitious bias would
ooze over the trial, washing away the Courts integrity.326 As Justice Frankfur-
ter once wrote, “The appearance of impartiality is an essential manifestation
of its reality.”327
But while voir dire and for-cause challenges remain a central protection
in securing an impartial jury post-Peña-Rodriguez, the ongoing need for per-
emptory challenges is less clear. Although the Supreme Court has described
the peremptory challenge process as a “means to achieve an impartial ju-
ry,”328 its effectiveness is questionable. The supposed idea is that the parties
will strike the most extreme potential jurors on either side of an issue, leav-
ing a body with perspectives lying somewhere in the middle.329 Likewise,
supporters of the practice claim that it allows litigants to strike those that
they suspect harbor bias that cannot be sufficiently articulated or proven to a
judge so as to justify challenge for cause.330 Finally, peremptory challenges
might act as a safety valve for those situations in which voir dire questioning
yields no productive basis for challenge but proves alienating to a potential
juror.331 But these justifications do not prove out. Studies show that litigants
regularly use voir dire and peremptory challenges to indoctrinate jurors to
their position and strike those opposed to it332 or to discriminate on little
more than vague stereotypes and hunches.333 True, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits litigants from exercising peremptory challenges based on rac-
ist or sexist notions, but the Court has failed to create an adequate enforce-
ment mechanism to police this restriction.334 As a result, litigants enjoy the
awesome power to manipulate with near-total caprice the constituents of a
325 . See James Forman, Jr., Essay, Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE
L.J. 895, 921 (2004) (quoting a Klansman who explained that “if we could get on the jury we
could save [the defendant]” (alteration in original)).
326. The Supreme Court has expressed concern in the past over how biases tend to infect
a juror’s ability to impartially review any aspect of a case implicating that bias. See, e .g ., Turner
v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“Because of the range of discretion en-
trusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial preju-
dice to operate but remain undetected.”).
327. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 182 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
328. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 125 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
329. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990).
330. JONM.VANDYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 146 (1977).
331. Babcock, supra note 199, at 554–55; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219–20
(1965).
332. Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV.
503, 528 (1965) (concluding from a series of studies that voir dire is more effectively used as a
forum for indoctrination than as a means for screening out biased jurors).
333 . See Babcock, supra note 199, at 553–54.
334 . See, e .g ., William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Pa-
tient, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 97, 134 (describing Batson as an “enforcement nightmare”).
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core constitutional actor, despite having no interest in ensuring impartiality
or in guaranteeing the institution’s integrity.
The continuing use of peremptory challenges is thus baffling from a
constitutional perspective. Professor Alschuler cogently explains the tension:
“The Equal Protection Clause says in essence, ‘When the government treats
people differently, it has to have a reason.’ The peremptory challenge says in
essence, ‘No, it doesn’t.’ ”335 To be sure, peremptory challenges are acts of
discrimination that if made in any other state action context would be illegal.
The availability of ex post substantive review serves only to further under-
mine the justification for this antiquated practice. Note that the Court al-
ready takes a glib look at the necessity of peremptory challenges. If a juror
lies during voir dire questioning, the challenging party must show that the
question dishonestly answered was “material” and then further show that a
“correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for
cause” in order to find relief.336 This strongly suggests that only those biases
that would subject a juror to for-cause challenge are constitutionally trou-
bling. As the Court continues to expound the competing contours of the im-
partial jury mandate, it might find that the curious case of peremptory chal-
lenges can no longer be tolerated.
The need to ensure that that the jury can fulfill its competing responsi-
bilities as dispenser of neutral and individualized justice as well as independ-
ent check on powerful political and social actors will at times require the
Court to expand and contract what has been traditionally thought the Con-
stitution requires. In this endeavor, the Court must tread lightly. If it opens
the door to ex post substantive review of every slight juror comment, it will
eradicate the jury’s independence. But if it ignores blatant and indefensible
injustice, the judiciary fails at one of its core objectives. By properly balanc-
ing the tension and compliments between ex ante procedures and ex post
review, courts can strengthen the jury as a judicial, political, and social insti-
tution.
CONCLUSION
Impartiality is the guiding principle of the Constitution’s jury trial pro-
tections. But when the Founders ratified those protections, they cemented an
institution defined by conflict. On one hand, they expected the jury to re-
ceive and carefully consider evidence without preconceptions. On the other
hand, the jury was anticipated to bring its experiences of the world and so
guide the administration of the law. That core tension continues to define
the court’s approach to securing impartiality. Until very recently, the ap-
proach taken has been to empanel jurors according to procedures that make
it more likely that the jury will be constitutionally impartial. Time and re-
peated experience have shown, however, that these ex ante procedures are
335. Alschuler, supra note 132, at 203.
336. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984).
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imperfect. Jurors regularly bring too much or the wrong kind of bias to bear
on disputes, with the weight falling regularly on those classes of individuals
traditionally excluded from the political process.
The Court has thus chosen to take a new approach. It has recognized
that where the traditional procedures prove inadequate, the Constitution re-
quires ex post substantive review of jury deliberations. That is, under some
circumstances judges are required to accept juror testimony of overt state-
ments made during deliberations to ensure that the jurors’ motivating ra-
tionales comport with the Constitution. While the Supreme Court has sug-
gested that this will be limited only to those instances in which racial animus
seemed to be a significant motivating factor in a jury’s decision to convict a
criminal defendant,337 it is unlikely that this rule will stay so confined. Sub-
stantive impartiality is likely to grow, and so represents a dramatic reformu-
lating of the Constitution’s jury trial protections.
Note that while the Court’s new approach to the impartial jury mandate
may help protect against certain institutional shortcomings, it too is imper-
fect. The persistent problem of jurors’ implicit biases, which deny litigants
fair consideration of their dispute, will continue to infect verdicts in felt but
unseen ways.338 Likewise, swaths of individuals with unique viewpoints will
continue to be systemically excluded from venires, their voices silenced in
the administration of justice.339 As such, courts must continue their efforts to
advance the promise of the Constitution’s impartial jury mandate, always
guided by the tension and balance that the institution requires.
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously claimed that “the life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience.”340 If this is true, it must be the com-
peting experiences of citizens that guide us forward. Indeed, it is the jurors
who bear that burden.
337 . See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 863 (2017).
338 . See Rudman et al., supra note 102, at 856.
339 . See Leipold, supra note 163, at 968–69.
340. Book Notice, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. anony-
mously reviewing C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(1879)).
